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1. INTRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
 
1.1 Introduction and objective of dissertation 
 
In May 2018, South Africa will implement a national minimum wage (NMW). Congruent with 
the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda of the United Nations, in particular the goal of the 
reduction of inequality and the promotion of decent work for everyone, a NMW is widely 
recognised as an important labour market policy instrument to alleviate social injustice and 
poverty by mitigating wage inequality and facilitating economic growth. In order to advance 
these goals however an effective legislative framework for a NMW is required, taking into 
account the prevailing socio-economic context in which the minimum wage will apply. Some 
of the essential elements that the legal framework must address, and which are considered in 
this dissertation are: the universal coverage of the minimum wage; the periodic adjustment of 
the minimum wage; interaction with collective bargaining; and compliance.1  
 
Research on international experience and the recommendations of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), inform this dissertation and its assessment of the proposed bill for the 
National Minimum Wage Act in South Africa. The dissertation considers the importance of 
context and the international law regime for a minimum wage before comparing the proposed 
National Minimum Wage Bill of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bill’; published 
in Government Gazette No. 41257 of 17 November 2017) to the institutional and legal 
framework for the German Minimum Wage Act (Mindestlohngesetz, hereinafter referred to as 
‘the MiLoG’) in order to examine if and how a NMW might contribute to social justice and 
economic growth in South Africa.  
 
It will be shown that a NMW may have major impacts on a country’s economy and its labour 
market. Considering the different economic conditions in a developed and an emerging 
economy, the dissertation critically assesses whether the NMW so far contributed to mitigate 
low pay in Germany; and whether the more vulnerable South African economy can effectively 
withstand a minimum wage and benefit from its implementation. In this regard, the interplay 
                                                
1 Other crucial issues that are important to make a minimum wage effective include the implementation in 
practice and accompanying policy measures like incentives, information campaign and social grants. To not 
exceed the scope, this dissertation predominantly focuses on the legal framework. 
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between collective bargaining and minimum wages will be discussed. The dissertation 
demonstrates that the successful implementation of a NMW requires a careful assessment of 
the domestic economy and circumstances. Predominantly based on the experience with the 
NMW in Germany, it is argued that a well-balanced legal framework is necessary to both avoid 
negative impacts on the labour market and to provide a measurable benefit to employees. 
 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 examines more generally the minimum 
wage as an intended tool to mitigate inequality and poverty from an international law 
perspective. Subsequently, the current German minimum wage legislation will be illustrated 
and set into context in Chapter 3; followed by Chapter 4 in which the National Minimum Wage 
Bill for South Africa is discussed. In Chapter 5 an assessment will be conducted, which 
evaluates the Bill’s legal framework by linking it to experiences on the MiLoG. Finally, 
Chapter 6 summarises the findings of this dissertation in a conclusion. In the remainder of 
Chapter 1, an overview of the South African and German economy and labour market is 
provided as background to the discussion and analysis on the legal framework for a NMW.  
 
1.2 Economic context: why is it important? 
 
To analyse and assess the proposed Bill and the MiLoG properly, it is necessary to initially 
consider the economic landscape of both countries. The economic context and the situation of 
unemployment are crucial indicators not only for setting the initial level of a minimum wage 
but the context should also inform the legal framework more generally. This section will 
therefore briefly outline the economic context in South Africa and Germany with emphasis on 
the unemployment situation and the distribution of low wages. As employment remains a key 
issue in relation to poverty alleviation, its protection and promotion consequently is of 
particular importance. 
 
1.2.1 The position in South Africa 
 
South Africa globally ranks as one of the most unequal countries in terms of income and wealth 
distribution.2 Although being still one of the world’s leading emerging economies only a 
minority of the South African population benefit from the economy, while many South 
                                                
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
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Africans live in poverty.3 According to the World Bank the poorest 20 percent of the population 
consume only less than 3 percent of total expenditure, while the richest 20 percent consume 65 
percent.4  
 
1.2.1.1 Economy and wages 
 
Alongside its remarkable peaceful political transition, South Africa became the most 
industrialized country in Africa.5 After the end of apartheid, in 1994, international sanctions 
were abolished and the South African economy increased rapidly.6 The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) almost tripled to over US$400 billion in 20117 and foreign exchange reserves 
increased from US$3 billion to $50 billion leading to the development of a growing middle-
income emerging economy.8 Alongside Nigeria, South Africa has by far the largest African 
economy.9 This development constitutes one major reason why South Africa became the first 
African member of the G-20 and the BRICS association.10   
 
South Africa benefits from an abundant supply of natural resources and is today one of the 
world's largest producer of platinum, gold, and chromium.11 Despite the mining industry, the 
economy is driven by a large agriculture, manufacturing and a whole sale and retail trade 
sector.12 
 
                                                
3 The International Business Report 2012: Emerging markets opportunity index: high growth economies Grant 
Thornton (2012) 26. 
4 Ibid. 
5 ‘Africa's Largest and most Industrialised Economy SA in Technical Recession’ Zambia Business Times 6 June 
2017, available at https://zambiabusinesstimes.com/2017/06/06/africas-most-industrialised-economy-sa-in-
technical-recession/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
6 Murray Leibbrandt, Ingrid Woolard, Hayley McEwen & Charlotte Koep. ‘Employment and Inequality 
Outcomes in South Africa’ (2009) 6.    
7 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
8 Tara Kangarlou ‘South Africa since apartheid: Boom or bust?’ CNN 27 November 2013, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/27/business/south-africa-since-apartheid/index.html, accessed on 7 February 
2018. 
9 ‘South Africa regains Africa's 'biggest economy' title from Nigeria’ BBC 11 August 2016, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37045276, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
10 Emmanuel Nnadozie & Catherine Grant Makokera ‘South Africa and the G-20’18 August 2014, available at 
http://www.gegafrica.org/g20-blog/south-africa-and-the-g-20, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
11 The Mineral Commodity Summaries 2018 U.S. Geological Survey (2018) 47, 71, 125. 
12 ‘Competitiveness of selected South African agricultural products in the European union market’ Department: 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (January 2011) 3. 
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In the early 2000s former President Thabo Mbeki significantly facilitated economic growth 
through incentivizing foreign investment.13 Various measures were conducted including easing 
of restrictive labour laws and the promotion of trade liberalization.14 The result of this 
development in South Africa was that the poverty rate dropped from 33.8 percent in 1996 to 
16.89 percent by 2008.15 
 
However, as South Africa successfully integrated itself into the global economy, the country 
also became vulnerable to global business cycles.16 According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) Public Information Notice,  
 
‘[p]rudent countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies, together with a flexible exchange rate, 
have helped dampen the adverse effects of those global cycles; and sound financial supervision 
has guided financial institutions in managing the associated risks.’17   
 
Nevertheless, South Africa recovered quite slowly from this recession.18  In 2016, economic 
growth nearly disappeared as the real GDP was estimated only 0.3 percent.19 For 2018, the 
GDP rate is at least projected to increase to 1.2 percent.20 This prognosis is based on the fact 
that agriculture and mining industry largely recovered leading to improvements in consumption 
and investment thereafter.21 
 
Although since the end of apartheid, living conditions have increased substantially for many 
South Africans, this fortunate development decelerated strongly owing to several serious 
difficulties.22 Low global economic growth specifically weakens domestic manufacturing and 
                                                
13 Michael Nowak ‘The First Ten Years After Apartheid: An Overview of the South African Economy’ in 
Michael Nowak and Luca Antonio Ricci (eds) Post-apartheid South Africa: the first ten years (2005) 6, 8. 
14 Ibid at 8. 
15 According to the World Bank poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) - 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
16 The IMF Country Report No. 11/258 (Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation) 4. 
17 The IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 11/115 (25 August 2011). 
18 Ibid. 
19 The IMF Country Report No. 17/189 (2017 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for South Africa) 5. 
20 The World Bank expects real GDP growth of only 0.6 percent in 2017 -
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview. 
21 IMF Country Report No. 17/189 op cit note 19 at 6. 
22 The murder rate has more than halved and the quality of housing increased (Erin Conway-Smith ‘20 years 
since apartheid: What's changed in South Africa, and what hasn't’ Global Post 27 April 2014, available at 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-27/20-years-apartheid-whats-changed-south-africa-and-what-hasn’t, 
accessed on 7 February 2018).  
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trade sectors due to a reduced demand for exports from South Africa and leads to low domestic 
growth. Accordingly, the economy’s lacking ability to generate jobs in times of economic 
stagnation results in a very high unemployment rate increasing from 22.5 percent in 2008 to 
27.7 percent in the first quarter of 2017.23 In addition, structural barriers such as political 
uncertainties,24 poor infrastructure or an inadequate education system exacerbate 
unemployment. Not surprisingly, employment and wages have been identified as the leading 
factors driving inequality in South Africa.25 Still, political instability, structural barriers and an 
overall slow economic growth maintain a high unemployment rate and low wages, which result 
in a national poverty line of over 50 per cent of the population.26 Besides, present economic 
growth is expected to be insufficient to keep pace with the increase in (working-age) population 
so that unemployment inevitably will even increase.27 
 
Some causes for poverty are closely linked to the current situation in the South African labour 
market.  
First, the high level of unemployment demonstrates that many people depend on welfare 
benefits to support themselves and their families.28 Promoting employment is therefore crucial 
to sustainably challenge poverty.  
Second, one also must notice that many employees on the South African labour market earn 
very low salaries.29 More specifically, employed persons in the poorest 20 percent of the 
households earn an average wage of R1,017 per month followed by employed persons in the 
second poorest 20 percent earning an average monthly wage of R1,707.30  Putting together both 
                                                
23 The unemployment rate would even rise to 36 percent if people who decided to give up looking for work 
would be included (IMF Country Report No. 17/189 op cit note 19 at 9). 
24 Just recently, in March 2017, President Jacob Zuma unpredictably removed his former and well-respected 
finance minister Pravin Gordhan from office, an action which resulted the downgrade of South Africa’s 
investment-grade status with two of the big three credit-ratings agencies (Fitch Rating and Standard and Poor’s) 
for the first time in 17 years (Marc Davies ‘South Africa Is Now Officially In A Recession As The Economy 
Keeps On Shrinking’ Huffington Post 6 June 2017, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/06/06/south-africa-is-now-officially-in-a-recession-as-the-economy-
kee_a_22128210/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
25 Leibbrandt et al op cit note 6 at 29. 
26 The World Bank as one of the leading institutions in measuring poverty distinguishes between poverty 
headcount ratio at national poverty lines, at $3.10 a day and at $1.90 a day -
http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty?locations=ZA-DE. 
27 IMF Country Report No. 17/189 op cit note 19 at 9. 
28 The ‘National Minimum Wage Panel Report to the Deputy President – Recommendations on Policy and 
Implementation’ (2016) 34. 




groups, they make up more than half of the total population in South Africa and have a narrow 
unemployment rate of 46.95 percent.31   
Third, poverty in working households is often owed to the large average number of non-
employed persons per employed.32  This mixture of high unemployment, low wages and large 
household size create an extremely low average household income and impede the challenge 
to overcome poverty. The comparison of low wages in poor households with the national 
average of R5,787 and the average wage of the richest 20 percent namely R13,458 shows on 
the one hand the extend of low wages and on the other hand the huge wage gap in the labour 
market.33  
Lastly, one must also consider that unemployment significantly differs between the races, 
leading also to social tensions within the labour market as unemployed black people struggle 
to reintegrate into the labour market. Whereas about eight percent of the white and 18 percent 
of the Asians/ Indians are unemployed, the unemployment rate of black people lies around 40 
percent.34 
To improve the living conditions of many low-income households, the South African 
government decided to implement a NMW amounting to R20 per hour.35  Nevertheless, despite 
the above presented current situation of the labour market, one major problem becomes 
evident: recipients of a NMW must be employed to gain any benefits. In fact, ironically in the 
poorest households the majority is unemployed and their income is therefore fully derived from 
government grants.36 These households may particularly benefit from a NMW if it also 
stimulates economic growth and job creation. 
To conclude, the South African labour market is characterized by the huge gap between the 
wages and incomes leading to an unequal distribution of income. Whereas a relevant number 
of employees did benefit from rising wages, the poorest people did not benefit as their income 
predominantly derives from social transfers.37 
 




34 Statistics South Africa (2014), available at 
https://www.statssa.gov.za/presentation/Stats%20SA%20presentation%20on%20skills%20and%20unemployme
nt_16%20September.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
35 The ‘Agreement on the introduction of a National Minimum Wage’ (published by the Department of Labour 
on 7 February 2017). 
36 NMW Panel Report op cit note 28 at 37. 
37 Ibid at 35. 
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1.2.1.2 Sectoral distribution of low wages  
 
After highlighting the economic situation in the previous section, this section shall illustrate 
the distribution of wages in different industry sectors to show which sectors may be affected 
by a NMW. Additionally, knowledge concerning the distribution is crucial for a later 
assessment as the National Minimum Wage Panel explicitly declared that its recommendations 
for a NMW inter alia are based on their assumptions on wage distribution.38 Given that wage 
income may not only derive from formal sectors but also from informal sectors, data will be 
used from most appropriate source, namely the ‘Labour Market Dynamics Report of 2014’ 
(LMDSA).39 
 
The South African economy consists of several key sectors, particularly finance and business 
services, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, construction, agriculture and mining.40 
According to the LMDSA 2014 dataset, 6.2 million employees, making up 47.3 percent of the 
employed persons earn less than R3,500 per month. This number comprises 90.7 percent of the 
employees in private households, 84.5 percent in the agricultural sector, 54.6 percent of all 
construction workers and 48.2 percent of wholesale and retail workers. In other words, a 
minimum wage of R20 per hour equivalent to approximately R3,500 per month effects nearly 
half of the total workforce in South Africa. Moreover, 34.8 percent of all employees earn even 
less than R2,500 per month, including over 70 percent of the workers in private households 
and agriculture and around 30 percent in the three biggest sectors wholesale and retail, 
manufacturing and community service providers. These numbers clearly demonstrate that a 
NMW affect nearly every sector. In particular domestic and agricultural workers but also 
workers in sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry such as clothing, textiles and furniture 




                                                
38 Ibid at 38. 
39 Data approach is based on the NMW Panel Report; numbers may partly turn out too high in certain wage 
levels as part-time and informal workers are included (NMW Panel Report op cit note 28 at 38). 
40 ‘Competitiveness of selected South African agricultural products in the European union market’ Department: 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (January 2011) 3. 
41 NMW Panel Report op cit note 28 at 45. 
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1.2.2 The German context 
 
The MiLoG came into force on 1 January 2015. Therefore, this section does not only give an 
overview on the current socio-economic environment in Germany but also concentrates on the 
situation in 2015. 
 
1.2.2.1 Economy and wages 
 
Germany is a highly-developed country, the largest economy in Europe and the fourth largest 
worldwide.42 Its GDP of around US$3,4 Trillion represents 5.4 percent of the global 
economy.43 Like many other leading economies, the German economy suffered dramatically 
under the global financial crisis as its annual GDP growth dropped from 3.26 percent in 2007 
to -5.62 percent in 2009.44  However, recovery measures, including the 400 billion euro rescue 
fund as well as two economic stimulus packages issued by the German Government, increased 
real GDP growth from 0.49 percent in 2012 to 1.72 percent to percent in 2015.45 
After the reunification in 1990, Germany had to manage the transformation of the East German 
planned economy towards an integrated market economy. This turned out to be very a 
challenging task as Eastern Germany suddenly became a part of a monetary union as well as 
part of the customs union of the European Community.46 
However, although Germany struggled under economic stagnation in the early 2000s including 
a high unemployment rate, the German economy successfully established as major market. The 
economic success is particularly based on a very strong export industry, technology and 
innovation, underpinned by prudent past structural reforms and a well-developed welfare 
system.47 As the economy is highly dependent on exports, consequently Germany was hit hard 
by the global financial crisis leading to the worst recession since 1949. However, the export 
economy was one important reason why the economy could recover relatively fast. 48 
                                                
42 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
43 https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/gdp, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
44 Ibid. 
45 http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/DEU/StartYear/2011/EndYear/2015/Indicator/NY-
GDP-MKTP-KD-ZG, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
46 East German firms suddenly lost their traditional eastern markets and had to compete nationally and globally 
without tariff protection (Bernd Martens [2010] ‘Wirtschaftlicher Zusammenbruch und Neuanfang nach 1990’ 
in bpb Dossier: Lange Wege der Deutschen Einheit 63-68). 
47 The IMF Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission (Germany 15 May 2017). 
48 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17300915, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
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Major exports are engineering products, especially machinery and shipbuilding, automobiles, 
electronics, chemical goods and metals.49 Moreover, innovative products like wind turbines 
and solar-power technology are exported from Germany.50 Two factors accelerated the 
economic power of the German export industry. First, the introduction of the euro currency, 
bolstered by the low-interest-rate policy of the European Central Bank fixed exchange rates in 
the European market.51 Due to this development, German products became more competitive 
as foreign importers did not need to exchange their own currency any more to purchase them. 
The positive consequence for German firms was a stabilizing effect on the value of their 
products. Second, the above-mentioned reforms known as ‘Agenda 2010’ successfully reduced 
unemployment and promoted economic growth. In turn, however, it also led to a stagnation of 
wage increase, which resulted in a historically low wage share of national income of only 64.5 
percent in 2008.52 In addition, employers and trade unions agreed on restricting wage growth 
to facilitate competiveness particularly in the euro zone.53 Hence, German companies could 
significantly increase their competiveness leading to a persistent current-account surplus which 
exceeds even China’s trade surplus.54  
Nevertheless, despite reforms and economic success, Germany faces a variety of social and 
economic challenges. Due to very low birth rate Germany’s population is ageing. This adverse 
demographic development risks negative impacts on the long-term preservation of the welfare, 
pension and health spending and exacerbate the lack of young professionals.55  Furthermore, 
the European debt crisis put pressure on German fiscal policies and since 2015, economy and 
society intensively discussed economic and social impacts of the migrant crisis.56 Concerning 
the latter, it is without doubt that the integration of refugees costs the Government money and 
may initially harm the German GDP.57 However, experts also estimate a chance to compensate 
                                                
49 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html, accessed on 7 February 2018 
50 https://web.archive.org/web/20061210163253/http://www.german-renewable-
energy.com/Renewables/Navigation/Englisch/wind-power.html, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
51 Christopher Cermak ‘Why Germany's Surplus Is So Huge’ Handelsblatt Global 21 April 2017, available at 
https://global.handelsblatt.com/finance/why-germanys-surplus-is-so-huge-752529, accessed on 7 February 
2018. 
52 The ‘Global Wage Report 2012/13: Wages and equitable growth’ (Geneva, International Labour Office, 
2013) 43. 
53 ‘Surplus war Germany’s current-account surplus is a problem’ The Economist 11 February 2017, available at 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21716641-not-reasons-donald-trump-thinks-it-germanys-current-
account-surplus-problem, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
54 Cermak op cit note 51. 
55 Stefan Wagstyl ‘Germany’s demographic dilemma’ Financial Times 16 November 2016, available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/a4d8316e-8566-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5, accessed on 7 February 2017. 
56 Mark Melin ‘Here's how the refugee crisis is impacting Germany's economy’ Business Insider 29 March 
2016, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/impact-refugee-crisis-on-germanys-economy-2016-3, 




the aging population through the integration of migrants into the German labour market.58 
Accordingly, the European Commission states that the high inflow of migrants is likely to 
stimulate GDP growth in the short term through additional public spending on refugees and 
housing investment whereas the long-term impact depends on the successful integration into 
the labour market.59 
Moreover, throughout the last years it became clearer that not everyone in society was able to 
benefit from the economic success. According to the Federal Statistical Office, the risk-of-
poverty rate increased from 14.7 percent in 2005 up to 15.7 percent in 2015.60 This rate applies 
to every person who have an income less than 60 percent of the German median income. 
Measuring poverty is difficult and often contentious as it depends on the national circumstances 
of living.61 The German government defines poverty more narrowly with the result of 8 million 
people being poor in 2015.62 Without doubt, in terms of quality, poverty in Germany cannot be 
equated with poverty in South Africa which must be measured by the World Bank criteria. 
Therefore, according to poverty in Germany the term ‘relative (national) poverty’ would be 
more precise in contrast to ‘absolute poverty’ in South Africa. The statistics illustrate that at 
least inequality is a key issue in Germany as well. 
Unlike in South Africa, poverty and inequality are not that strongly linked to unemployment. 
Whereas the unemployment rate decreased significantly from over 11.7 percent in 2007 to 
under 6.4 percent in 2015, the poverty-risk and minimum-hedging rate have in fact increased.63 
Consequently, one must assume that the creation of jobs is not necessary a guarantee to reduce 
poverty as long as these newly created jobs do not provide enough working hours or adequate 
pay. This phenomena of ‘working poor’ is underpinned by the fact that in 2014 nearly ten 
                                                
58 The IMF Country Report No. 16/202 (2016 Article IV Consultation – Press Release; Staff Report; and 
Statement by the Executive Director for Germany) 13. 
59 The Commission Staff Working Document Country Report Germany 2016 (European Commission 26 
February 2016) 5, 6.  
60 Florian Diekmann ‘Armutsrisiko steigt auf höchsten Stand seit Wiedervereinigung’ Spiegel Online 16 
September 2016, available at http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/armut-in-deutschland-das-risiko-steigt-
wieder-obwohl-die-wirtschaft-laeuft-a-1112646.html, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
61 Poverty is often seen as a complex phenomenon which cannot be measured only by the criteria of income. 
Price differences in different areas, age and social welfare systems cannot be ignored in this equation (See 
Angelika Finkenwirth & Stefanie Diemand ‘Wie arm sind die Deutschen?’ Zeit Online 2 March 2017, available 
at http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2017-03/armutsbericht-2017-deutschland-paritaetischer-wohlfahrtsverband-faq, 
accessed on 7 February 2018; If one compares poverty in South Africa and Germany it seems logical to define 
poverty by means of what things a person really needs to not be poor. 
62 Kolja Rudzio ‘Wie arm ist Deutschland wirklich?’ Zeit Online 19 April 2017, available at 




quoten/, both accessed on 7 February 2018. 
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percent of employed people were at the risk of poverty.64 In fact, one can conclude that the 
positive development of the German labour market is predominantly owed to an increase of 
atypical employment, particularly part-time work recurrent in the service and low-wage 
sector.65 
 
The average monthly gross income of a full-time employed person in 2015 was EUR 3,612 66 
and the average net-income per household amounted in 2014 EUR 3,147.67 17 percent of the 
employed persons earn an average net income of less than EUR 900 and 36 percent have a net 
income less than EUR 1,300.68 It is striking that the group of 19 percent having a net income 
between EUR 900 and EUR 1,300 make up the largest group within the whole income 
distribution. To conclude, whereas the average net-income in Germany is relatively high, a 
large group of people do not benefit from the economic prosperity and suffer under low wages. 
Especially single parent households with an average net-income of EUR 2,294 are often at risk 
of poverty as these households consist of more non-employed persons.69 
 
1.2.2.2 Sectoral distribution of low wages in Germany 
 
The data used to illustrate the low-wage sector comes from the German Federal Statistical 
Office. Based on the common international definition, the Federal Statistical Office uses a low-
wage definition based on the median-wage.70 
According to these statistics, in 2014, 21.4 percent of the employed earned wages below the 
low-wage line marked at an hourly gross-wage of EUR 10.00.71 As mentioned above, 
particularly the service sector includes low-paid branches. Thus, low wages are often earned 
by taxi drivers (83.7 percent), merchants in retail (83.7 percent), workers in video libraries 
                                                
64 Dorothee Spannagel, Daniel Seikel, Karin Schulze Buschoff & Helge Baumann ’Aktivierungspolitik und 
Erwerbsarmut in Europa und Deutschland’ (2017) WSI-Report Nr.36 1. 
65 Ibid. 
66 https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/5760/umfrage/verfuegbares-nettoeinkommen---
einkommensklassen/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
67 ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch 2016’ (German Federal Statistical Office 2106) 168.  
68 Nicolai Kwasniewski & Christina Elmer ‘Wo Sie mit Ihrem Einkommen stehen’ Spiegel Online 6 September 
2013, available at http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/einkommen-und-gehalt-wo-sie-im-vergleich-liegen-
a-920777.html, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
69 According to the German Federal Statistical Office, in 2015, one third of the single parent families were at the 
risk of poverty (Statistisches Jahrbuch 2016 op cit note 67 at 169). 
70 The median-wage is bound to the specific person standing right in the middle of the line starting with the 
person having the lowest wage-income and ending with the best-paid person. In other words, 50 percent are 
earning more and the other 50 percent less than the median-wage. 
71 ‘Verdienste auf einen Blick’ (German Federal Statistical Office 2017) 8.  
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(80.5 percent), hair dressers (78.5 percent) as well as in the catering and hospitality sector (77 
percent).72 Furthermore, also workers in the butchery sector and forestry workers are 




South Africa is an emerging economy whereas Germany is a highly-developed country. 
Economic power, labour market and poverty vary widely in both countries. 
Although South Africa achieved significant economic and social development over the last 
decades, recently economic growth has stagnated, causing a deterioration of the unemployment 
situation. A tremendous amount of the people suffers under absolute poverty due to 
unemployment and low wages. The lack of job creation is owed to a low global economic 
growth, which hurts the South African export industry as well as to structural domestic barriers. 
Although many of the poorest people are unemployed, the introduction of a NMW would affect 
many employees as nearly 50 percent of the South African workforce is struggling with low 
wages of less than R3,500 per month.   
 
Germany widely recovered from major economic difficulties like the reunification and the 
global financial crisis. Structural reforms and competiveness of the German industry facilitated 
economic growth and remarkably decreased unemployment. However, this development gave 
not equal benefit to everyone in society. The proportion of people being at the risk of poverty 
continuously increased and the low-wage sector spread rapidly.   
Nevertheless, despite all social and economic differences, although on another scale with 
respect to poverty and inequality, both countries also have similar problems such that the 
objectives, considerations and concerns regarding the implementation of a NMW are 
nonetheless largely congruent. Thus, it is reasonable to compare the German minimum wage 
legislation with the proposed Bill to assess the efficiency and benefit of the latter. 
 
  
                                                
72https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Arbeitsmarkt/_Doorpage/Indikatoren_Qu
alitaetDerArbeit.html?cms_gtp=318944_slot%253D2, accessed on 7 February 2018. (it should be noticed that 
these figures also include sideline employment and second jobs). 
73 https://www.iwd.de/artikel/die-niedriglohnbranchen-boomen-147596/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
 13 




Before a consideration of the specific national frameworks in Chapter 3 and 4, this chapter 
introduces more generally the objective and concepts behind minimum wage laws from an 
international law perspective. Based on the history and the relevant ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations, the chapter will consider the types of minimum wage systems that are in 
place, concerns that may arise regarding these systems, and alternative instruments that might 
compete with (or complement) minimum wages also aiming to mitigate inequality. 
Special emphasis will be put on the previously mentioned important elements of the legal 
framework for minimum wages, namely: the universal coverage of the minimum wage; the 
periodic adjustment of the minimum wage; interaction with collective bargaining; and 
compliance.  
 
2.2 Historical background 
 
The roots of minimum wages date back until the end of the 20th century. In the 1890s, for the 
first time, minimum wage legislation was introduced in New Zealand and Australia to 
overcome a negotiation disparity between workers in sweatshops and their employers.74 In 
1919, the League of Nations established the ILO as a new international agency specializing on 
the amelioration of labour standards, the social protection of workers as well as job 
promotion.75 At that time only a few countries had already introduced minimum wages for 
certain sectors.76 Upon the proposal of the Paraguay delegation the issue of setting minimum 
wages was subject to a discussion on the 1927 session of the International Labour Conference 
resulting in the adoption of the Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 
                                                
74 Charles Henry Verrill ‘Minimum-wage Legislation in the United States and Foreign Countries’ (1915) in 
Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics: Miscellaneous series (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
April 1915) 104. 
75 http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm, accessed on 7 February 
2018. 
76 Among others, Australia, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom had introduced minimum 




26)77, and Recommendation, 1928 (No. 30).78 In Convention No 26, the Parties agreed to 
attempt to introduce minimum wages for certain areas of work ‘in which no arrangements exist 
for the effective regulation of wages by collective agreement or otherwise and wages are 
exceptionally low’.79 This convention established the first international comprehensive system 
regarding how and where to set minimum wages. 
After the Second World War, the International Labour Conference adopted the ‘Declaration of 
Philadelphia’ explicitly clarifying that ‘poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity 
everywhere’ (Part I(c)) and recognizing that a minimum living wage can be an appropriate tool 
to ensure certain prosperity for all employed (Part III(d)).80 Consequently, during the decades 
which followed, the Conference tried to promote minimum wage protection, particularly for 
sectors excluded from collective agreement coverage. The Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery 
Convention, 1951 (No. 99) focused on the agriculture sector but could also be applied to other 
areas in consultation with the social partners. In contrast to Convention No. 26, Convention 
No. 99 determined a stricter use of exemptions from statutory minimum wages. However, 
despite global economic growth, for many employees living conditions did not significantly 
improve, particularly in developing countries, where the poverty level remained high.81 As a 
result, the objective of social protection and the concept of minimum wages received increasing 
attention.82 Hence, in 1967, the ILO decided to review former conventions regarding minimum 
wages with special reference to developing countries. Concluding that none of the existing 
conventions provide criteria for the fixing of actual wages nor provisions for the periodical 
adjustment of minimum wages, the Parties discussed on the 53rd Session (1969) of the 
International Labour Conference the ‘minimum wage fixing machinery and related problems, 
with special reference to developing countries’ followed by the later adoption of the 
Convention No. 131 and the related Recommendation No. 135.83  
Still today, these key documents are taken into account if a country decides to design and 
implement a legal minimum wage framework. Moreover, the ILO has developed international 
                                                
77 The Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 26) came into force on 14 June 1930 and has 
been ratified by 103 States (status as of 2014). 
78 ‘Minimum wage systems’ General Survey of the reports on the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 
(No. 131), and the Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation, 1970 (No. 135) (International Labour Conference 
103rd Session) 2. 
79 Article 1 of ILO Convention No. 26. 
80 Minimum wage systems op cit note 78 at 3. 
81 Ibid at 31. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid at 6; The Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131) came into force on 29 April 1972 and has 
been ratified by 52 States (status as of 2014). 
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standards set out in the ILO Constitution and various conventions.84 Accordingly, basic 
principles like the freedom of collective bargaining, the equal remuneration for men and 
women workers for work of equal value, the elimination of any discrimination and the 
compliance with international labour standards are essential for the consideration of 
implementing a minimum wage.85 As illustrated in the next section, the concept, fixing 
machinery and typical characteristics for minimum wages are based on ILO findings. After a 
period of stagnation between the mid-1980s until the early 2000s, the instrument of minimum 
wage policy again received increasing attention in response to large amounts of vulnerable 
employees as a product of global economic growth driven by globalization.86 Since 2000, 
Convention No. 131 has been ratified by 11 new States and the Conference spared no effort to 
promote minimum wage policy by stating that minimum wages not only enhance living 
conditions but also improve the quality of work, increase demand and contribute to economic 
stability.87 Additionally, the ILO provides technical assistance regarding implementation and 
operation of minimum wage policies and publishes ‘Global Wage Reports’. 
 
2.3 Concept of minimum wages 
 
ILO Convention No. 131 must be seen in combination with its accompanying ILO Minimum 
Wage Fixing Recommendation No. 135. They both not only underline the crucial aspects for 
implementing minimum wage legislation but also provide information on purpose and reasons 
for doing so. 
Paragraph 1 of Recommendation No.135 specifies the purpose of introducing minimum wages. 
It points out that minimum wages should be seen as one instrument among others in a policy 
to effectively mitigate poverty by ensuring a certain level of protection for disadvantaged 
groups of wage earners. This protection is particularly needed for workers which earn very low 
wages because of market competition resulting to a ‘race to the bottom’.88 In addition, the 
preamble sees minimum wages as an element contributing to economic growth and social 
                                                
84 An overview of the fundamental Conventions can be found at 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-
recommendations/lang--en/index.htm, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
85 Minimum wage systems op cit note 78 at 8. 
86 Ibid at 9. 
87 Ibid at 10. 
88 Ibid at 32. 
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development such as the improvement of conditions for a fair competition between 
employers.89  
According to the ILO Committee the minimum wage may be defined as  
 
‘the minimum sum payable to a worker for work performed or services rendered, within a given 
period, whether calculated on the basis of time or output, which may not be reduced either by 
individual or collective agreement, which is guaranteed by law and which may be fixed in such 
a way as to cover the minimum needs of the worker and his or her family, in the light of national 
economic and social conditions’.90  
 
This definition sums up two main pillars of every minimum wage system. First, it states the 
major characteristic feature of a minimum wage - its binding nature, no matter how a certain 
minimum wage got fixed. Second, the definition highlights the importance of substantial social 
and economic aspects which need to be carefully considered while determining coverage, level 
and adjustments of the minimum wage. These two aspects can also be retrieved in Convention 
No. 131. Accordingly, article 2 emphasises the binding nature stating that minimum wages 
‘shall have the force of law and shall not be subject to abatement’ whereas article 3 concludes 
the criteria for determining the specific level of minimum wages. Article 1 paragraph 1 of the 
Convention No. 131 determines one essential principle which marks an important innovation 
compared to former conventions. Claiming that every ratifying state shall establish a system of 
minimum wages which covers all groups of wage earners whose terms of employment are such 
that coverage would be appropriate, Convention No. 131 determines the scope of application 
as broad as possible.91 In this context, paragraph 4 of Recommendation No. 135 substantiate 
the principle of universality specifying that 
 
‘[t]he number and groups of wage earners who are not covered in pursuance of Article 1 of the 
Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970, should be kept to a minimum.’ 
 
Paragraph 11 focuses on the important issue of adjusting existing minimum wages. 
Accordingly, to maintain a certain level of social protection for workers through minimum 
wages a periodical adjustment considering changes in living costs and other economic factors 
                                                
89 Ibid. 
90 ‘Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: Minimum 
wages Report III (Part 4B)’ (International Labour Conference, 79th Session, Geneva, 1992) para 42. 
91 Minimum wage systems op cit note 78 at 30. 
 
 17 
is needed.  In that regard, article 1 paragraph 2 deals with the decision-making body. The 
provision makes clear that the competent authority shall only determine the groups of 
employees covered by minimum wages after full consultation with the social partners. As 
stated in article 4 paragraph 2 and 3, the social partners shall also be involved with regard to 
the minimum wage fixing machinery, which should be complemented by experts with 
recognized competence for representing a country’s overall national interests.  
Having in mind, the difficulty to achieve full compliance, article 5 claims national measures to 
ensure effective application and enforcement of the minimum legislation. More precisely, 
paragraph 14 of the Recommendation No. 135 sets up specific criteria for these measures, 
including the call for creating public awareness, simple and effective legal remedies for 
employees and adequate penalties in case of non-compliance. 
 
2.4 Two approaches to a national minimum wage 
 
There are to two different types of minimum wages. As concluded in paragraph 5(1) of 
Recommendation No. 135 there is either the possibility to fix one single minimum wage of 
general application or fixing a series of minimum wages applying to particular sectors or 
groups of employees. 
Given that article 1 paragraph 1 claims a broad coverage to workers where minimum wages 
are appropriate, consequently the issue of exemptions arises. Accordingly, article 1 paragraph 
3 indicates that exemptions should generally not be prohibited as long as they are necessary to 
prevent negative effects due to the application of minimum wages. The amount of exemptions 
depends not only on the national circumstances but also on the chosen type of minimum wage. 
Whereas series of minimum wages only apply to certain groups, there is less need of 
exemptions compared to an extensive NMW, which shall on principle apply to every employee.  
Moreover, paragraph 6 of Recommendation No. 135 provides various approaches to fix 
minimum wages. Thus, it becomes clear that countries should examine which fixing concept 
suits best to their domestic circumstances. Interestingly, the last form to fix minimum wages 
refers to the possibility to give force of law to provisions of collective agreements. Collective 
agreements constitute the essential instrument to rule wages and working conditions 
collectively. As legislation often incorporates provisions which allow to extend those 
agreements under certain requirements, one might argue that implementing a NMW is 
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dispensable. In order to examine the relationship, the next section will give a brief overview 
on collective bargaining and set it into context with minimum wages. 
 
2.5 The minimum wage and collective bargaining 
 
2.5.1 Definition and objective of collective bargaining 
 
Based on a long history, collective bargaining established as a fundamental right at work and 
has become the major instrument to rule terms of employments collectively. To overcome the 
natural disparity between the employee, who regularly depends on his work as a basis for his 
existence and the employer, who naturally has an advantage in the negotiations concerning 
employment conditions, the idea was to transfer those negotiations onto a collective level. 
Aiming to ensure the basic needs for employees, experts on both sides should conclude 
agreements. 
Article 2 of the ILO Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154) defines collective 
bargaining as a general term  
 
‘to all negotiations which take place between an employer, a group of employers or one or more 
employers’ organisations, on the one hand, and one or more workers’ organisations, on the 
other, for:  
(a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or  
(b) regulating relations between employers and workers; and/or  
(c) regulating relations between employers or their organisations and a workers’ 
organisation or workers’ organisations’.’  
 
This definition includes the parties involved as well as the possible objects of negotiation. As 
an important ‘term of employment’, wages are often the most contentious subjects in collective 
negotiations and can be fixed through collective agreements.92 This is the reason why those 
collective wage agreements may be classified as competing instrument to statutory wages.  
 
 
                                                
92 ‘Collective bargaining: a policy guide’ (International Labour Office, Governance and Tripartism Department, 





The procedure of collective bargaining does not follow a regular pattern. Negotiations can 
include various forms of discussions, either in a formal or an informal way, aiming to conclude 
an agreement which respects mutual interests.93 Thus, the bargaining parties can agree on ad 
hoc arrangements or use formal institutional settings. To effectively achieve positive results, 
negotiations should always be conducted under the principle of good faith.  
Collective bargaining intends that the parties involved conclude a collective agreement. The 
ILO highlights three important characteristics those agreements should fulfil: first, they should 
bind the signatories and those, on whose behalf they are concluded; second, the general 
application to every worker in a specific group, which is covered by the undertakings and its 
representatives; and third, the primacy over individual contractual employment agreements as 
long as these individual agreements are not more favourable to workers (‘principle of 
favourability’).94 
In practice, two models to incorporate collective bargaining into domestic statutory 
frameworks developed over time, trying to bear in mind domestic macroeconomic and political 
circumstances: the understanding of collective bargaining as an entirely voluntary process and 
the concept of a duty to bargain.95 As there are numerous ways to shape a bargaining system, 
those systems can vary from a purely voluntarily non-state intervention approach to statutory 




The major benefit of collective bargaining can be seen in its contribution to improvements in 
wages and working conditions, as well as equality.96 Effective collective agreements are highly 
accepted by every party concerned as collective bargaining and their outcomes usually are 
based on a free and voluntary approach providing a sustainable working guideline. This can 
enhance respectful and productive labour relations between workers and their employer by 
avoiding costly labour disputes. Aiming mutual recognition, the outcome at best shall provide 
                                                
93 Ibid at 2. 
94 Ibid at 3. 
95 John Pencavel ‘The Appropriate Design of Collective Bargaining Systems: Learning From the Experience of 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand’ (1999) Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 466. 
96 Collective bargaining: a policy guide op cit note 92 at 4. 
 
 20 
positive results for both sides – improving the job quality for workers and simultaneously 
facilitating productivity and enterprise performance.97 
 
2.5.4 Coverage and application 
 
All these benefits of collective bargaining can only be enjoyed if the negotiation outcome 
effectively applies to a broad number of employers and their employees. However, in fact the 
coverage is one of the weaknesses of this policy instrument. 
Generally, only the police and army are excluded from the general right to collective 
bargaining.98 Every other employee is free to join or establish a trade union in order to express 
his claims collectively. Being a trade union member entitles an employee to benefit from the 
outcome negotiated by experts on their behalf. Consequently, employees who do not join a 
trade union are not able to claim these benefits as they are not covered by collective agreements. 
However, during the last decades the definition of employee and dependent work have became 
blurred.99 Given that only employees who engage in dependent work can be covered by 
collective agreements, it is often contentious if workers can be classified as independent 
contractors. Contractual arrangements may undermine collective bargaining if workers are 
characterized as independent contractors while in fact find themselves in a disguised 
employment relationship.100 As a result, especially in countries with weak statutory worker 
protection a significant amount of labour force cannot fully assert their right to collective 
bargaining.101 
Nevertheless, collective bargaining remains an important tool to set certain levels of wages. 
Article 2 (2) of Convention No. 131 recognizes the freedom of collective bargaining and thus 
respects this policy approach as an accompanying tool to fix wages. Collective bargaining is 
possible on enterprise, sectoral or even national level. Besides, its outcomes may not only be 
binding to the signatories and those they represent but can also obtain general applicability 
through an extension authorized by an authority under certain legal requirements. According 
to paragraph 5(1) and (2) of the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), the 
extension of an agreement must be requested by at least one negotiating party. Moreover, those 
who would fall under the general applicability should be included in the progress. The granting 
                                                
97 Ibid at 5, 6. 






of extensions usually depends on the existence of public interest considerations.102 Hence, the 
question arises, if minimum wage levels can be classified as an important public interest with 
the consequence that they therefore should be better incorporated in a collective bargaining 
framework. The following Chapters will revive this contentious question show that it can be 




As implied above, fixing minimum wages has not only proponents. Whereas there is consensus 
regarding the intention to improve the overall living and working conditions of workers, 
experts argue about the appropriate means. Concerning the issue of minimum wages, there are 
concerns on various levels. Economically and politically, there is disagreement whether the 
implementation of a NMW is the right policy approach as it might have negative impacts on 
job growth and employment.103 Theoretically, employment effects may either be evaluated as 
negative, positive or even neutral depending which labour market theory one favours.104 
However, existing international empirical evidence allow different conclusions.105 Moreover, 
scholars, economists and policymaker argue over the appropriate type, level, fixing machinery 
and application of a minimum wage. As explicitly mentioned by the International Organisation 
of Employers (IOE), critics fear several negative repercussions, including: decreasing labour 
market experience; less on-the-job training; reduced productivity; as well as decelerated 
enterprise creation and growth.106 In addition, other means like the expansion of the social 
welfare systems are debated as more effective alternatives to a minimum wage.107 




                                                
102 Ibid at 70. 
103 Jonathan Meer & Jeremy West ‘Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment Dynamics’ 
NBER Working Paper No. 19262 (January 2015) 1, 22. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Oliver Bruttel, Arne Baumann & Matthias Dütsch ‘The new German statutory minimum wage in 
comparative perspective: Employment effects and other adjustment channels’ European Journal of Industrial 
Relations (2017) 3. 






Establishing a minimum wage framework is not a new policy approach. For a long time, the 
ILO acknowledged minimum wages and many countries already use this instrument aiming to 
mitigate wage and social inequality. However, it remains contentious if, when and how 
minimum wages can facilitate economic growth and social justice without having drastic 
negative side effects on the economy and the labour market. As social norms and economic 
circumstances may differ in every country, it is without doubt that a minimum wage system 
must be carefully adjusted to them in order to prevent negative repercussions as far as 
possible.108 In the following chapter, it will be examined and assessed whether the German 






                                                
108 Wendy V. Cunningham ‘Minimum Wages and Social Policy: Lessons from Developing Countries’ (2007, 
The World Bank) 70. 
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3. THE GERMAN MINIMUM WAGE ACT 
 
3.1 Debate and implementation 
 
Although the instrument of a mandatory minimum wage is in place in many jurisdictions, likely 
impacts and legal implementation are still highly contentious topics. In January 2015, the 
German NMW came into force after a long and intense national debate lasting over 10 years.109 
In order to comprehend the legal framework of the Minimum Wage Act, its provisions must 
be set within context the German wage-setting mechanism and labour market.  
 
3.1.1 German labour market and wage-setting system 
 
Germany always followed a rather voluntary collective bargaining approach. Employers or 
employers’ organisations negotiated with representative trade unions to conclude collective 
agreements over working conditions and wages either on enterprise or sectoral level.110 As 
collective bargaining usually takes place on sectoral level without any direct state intervention, 
the German system can be described as ‘autonomous’.111 The state only gets involved in the 
wage-setting process if the social partners decide to apply for a general application of a 
collective agreement. However, it can be seen that generally binding collective pay agreements 
constantly run after their actual purpose to cover sectors with weak trade union activity. In 
practice, these agreements exist only to a small extend in industries consisting of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, where trade unions traditionally do not have strong bargaining 
power due to a lack of codetermination.112 
Whereas until the mid-1990s, German employees enjoyed a broad coverage of collective 
agreements of about 85 percent, in the following time, employers’ willingness to further on 
comply with collective agreements started to diminish.113  In 2013, the coverage of collective 
agreements fell to only 60 percent in Western Germany and 48 percent in Eastern Germany.114 
Several factors impinged that development and increased the low-wage sector.  
                                                
109 Gerhard Bosch ‘The bumpy road to a National Minimum Wage in Germany’ (2015) 3. 
110 Annelie Marquardt ‘Collective Agreements’ (XIVth Meeting of European Labour Court Judges 4 September 
2006 Cour de cassation Paris) 5.  
111 Bosch op cit note 109 at 4. 
112 Ibid at 5, 6.  
113 Ibid at 6. 
114 https://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_2257.htm, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
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First to mention are the changing corporate strategies, which can be seen as a result to the 
historical events of the reunification of Germany and the rising global market. To challenge 
new competitors not only domestically but also globally, enterprises searched for new ways to 
cut wage cost.115 Consequently, production was partly relocated in foreign countries and many 
jobs were outsourced to avoid coverage by collective agreements. In addition, many public 
services were opened to private operators which were not bound by collective agreements to a 
large extend.116 Because of that development, employees often work together under one roof, 
albeit they do not have the same employer. As a result, wages more often are not set by 
collective agreements any more, but rather are subject to individual provisions.117 
The development outlined above got even bolstered by labour reforms in 2003 facilitating 
temporary agency employment and ‘mini jobs’ with a maximal monthly salary of EUR 450.118 
As a response to five million unemployed people, these reforms intended to give rise to the 
low-wage sector. Many employers decided to hire mini-jobbers for economic reasons as these 
workers – in contrast to part-time workers - do not enjoy social security contributions. As a 
result, trade unions lost power because most mini-jobbers were, and still are not organised and 
difficult to reach.119 This development continued and led to a large low-wage sector with little 
coverage by collective agreements. 
In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 1, mutual agreements between unions and management  
(particularly in the export industry) limited wage increase compared to other European 
countries.120 
 
Today, there are different factors which determine the wage of an employee. The most 
important source is of course the employment contract between the employer and the 
employee.121 Individually, they can agree on a certain salary. Furthermore, a collective 
agreement may apply to the employment relationship. This can either be because of mutual 
membership to the bargaining parties122, individual agreement123 or due to the fact that a 
                                                
115 Bosch op cit note 109 at 9, 10. 




120 Cermak op cit note 50. 
121 See section 611(1) German Civil Code (BGB). 
122 See section 3(1) Collective Agreements Act (TVG). 
123 Employer and employee can individually add a reference clause to the employment agreement. 
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collective agreement has been declared as generally binding.124 Finally, since 2015, the 
statutory minimum wage generally applies with certain exemptions as an absolute wage floor 
for every employee. 
 
3.1.2 Low-wage sector 
 
According to data from the German Government, the low-wage sector makes up 21.4 percent 
of the total workforce.125 Statisticians classify a wage as low-wage if it amounts to less than 
two thirds under the median-wage of all employed people.126 It is conspicuous that among the 
low-wage earners, most are employed atypically. Over 40 percent of the atypical worker earn 
low-wages, in particular short-time and temporary workers, but also workers with fixed-term 
employment contracts and mini-jobbers.127 One may assume that, education and qualification 
does not automatically protect people from earning low wages. In fact, in 2013, two third of 
the low wage earners had completed a vocational training, over ten percent had even attained 
a higher education degree.128 Nevertheless, the better the qualification, the less likely it is to 
work for low wages. Whereas only 24.3 of the people with a vocational training earn low 
wages, nearly 44 percent of the non-qualified people work in the low-wage sector.129 
In addition, it is mentionable that women make up a significant share of the low-wage earners. 
Nearly one third of all employed women earn low-wages. Regarding the age of low-wage 
earners one can conclude that low-wages are becoming a big challenge for young people. 
Although nearly 50 percent of the low-wage earners are older than 45 years, over 50 percent 
of the employees under 25 earn low wages.130 
 
3.1.3 Recitals for the implementation of a national minimum wage 
 
As indicated above, extensive deregulation on the German labour market, cuts in transfer 
payments as well as more stringent rules, forced long-term unemployed people to accept job 
                                                
124 There are two legal possibilities to achieve a universal application: the declaration of general applicability of 
collective agreements under the requirements of section 5 TVG and the general applicability for foreign 
employers under the legal statutes of the Posted Workers Act (AEntG). These binding collective agreements can 
be referred to as ‘industry specific minimum wages’ (Ibid). 
125 http://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++4c4fccfc-737a-11e7-b9d0-525400e5a74a, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
126 https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/wage-levels.htm, accessed on 7 February 2018.   
127 http://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++4c4fccfc-737a-11e7-b9d0-525400e5a74a, accessed on 7 February 2018.   
128 Thorsten Kalina & Claudia Weinkopf ’Niedriglohnbeschäftigung 2013: Stagnation auf hohem Niveau’ IAQ-
Report 03/2015 (2015) 4. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid at 5. 
 
 26 
offers which led to a massive increase of low paid workers. According to the researchers of the 
Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), the strict conditionality of access to transfer 
payments (commonly known as ‘the workfare approach’) only lead a broad exchange of poor 
unemployed people to poor workers.131 These findings were shared by several unions. 
Accompanied by their continuing loss of membership due to the outsourcing of operations to 
temporary work agencies or subcontractors, which are not bound by collective agreements and 
the recognition that bargaining adequate wages has become very tough in several industries, in 
2006, the German Trade Union Confederation agreed to campaign for a NMW.132 
Nevertheless, this undertaking was initially not politically supported by the left-winged 
government, which intended to push pay downwards at the lower end of the wage distribution 
in order to mitigate the high unemployment rate.133 However, in light of the growing overall 
popularity of the idea to introduce a minimum wage and the positive economic situation, the 
political climate shifted towards a more minimum wage friendly sentiment.134 Due to warnings 
of domestic economic research institutes, which amplified the fears of dramatic job losses 
especially in Eastern Germany and the unforeseen financial crisis, instead of directly 
introducing a NMW the German government decided to establish several industry-level 
minimum wages by using the instrument of declaring existing collective agreements as 
generally binding, which is provided by the Posted Workers Act.135 Although employer’s 
associations opposed a minimum wage, the left political camp agreed to make the demand for 
a minimum wage a core issue for the 2013 elections. The reasons for this decision include the 
fact that so far, no negative impacts linked to industry-level minimum wages did occur and 
trade unions significantly increased pressure on their natural political allies.136 As an outcome 
of the new formed government, the new Minimum Wage Act was part of a large legislative 
package titled ‘Act on the Strengthening of Free Collective Bargaining’. Thereby, trade unions 
succeeded with their demand to link the introduction of a NMW with a general strengthening 
of free collective bargaining, including the possibility to establish industry-level minimum 
wages in all industries and to declare collective agreements as generally binding in case of a 
‘public interest’.137 
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3.2 Scope and exemptions  
 
The statutory minimum wage amounting EUR 8.50 has nearly universal coverage as it applies 
to every employee, including interns.  
Nevertheless, in accordance with the MiLoG, particular groups of employees are excluded 
from the personal scope of the act. Accordingly, section 22 MiLoG stipulates the following: 
 
‘(1) This Act applies to workers. Interns within the meaning of section 26 of the Vocational 
Training Act […] shall be regarded as workers within the meaning of this Act, unless they are 
doing 
1. an internship which is mandatory pursuant to a provision under education law in 
respect of schools, vocational training regulations, a provision under education 
law in respect of tertiary education or as part of vocational training at a vocational 
academy regulated by law, 
2. an internship of no more than three months as a period of vocational orientation 
or prior to commencing a higher education course, 
3. an internship of no more than three months which accompanies vocational 
training or tertiary education, unless such an internship relationship existed with 
the same trainee prior thereto, or 
4. introductory training in accordance with section 54a of the Third Book of the 
Social Code […] or preparation for vocational training in accordance with 
sections 68 to 70 of the Vocational Training Act. 
[…] 
(2) Those persons referred to in section 2 (1) and (2) of the Youth Employment Protection Act 
[…] who have not completed any vocational training shall not be regarded as workers within 
the meaning of this Act. 
(3) […] 
(4) In the first six months of their employment the minimum wage shall not apply to the 
employment relationships of workers who were classed as long-term unemployed within the 
meaning of section 18 (1) of the Third Book of the Social Code immediately prior to beginning 
their employment. […]’ 
 
Persuant to the principle of favourability, section 1 (3) MiLoG clarifies that industry-specific 
minimum wages established under the framework of the Posted Workers Act or the Act on 
Temporary Employment Businesses (AÜG) only prevail to the statutory minimum wage in 




3.3 Adjusting the level 
 
3.3.1 The minimum wage commission 
 
Whereas the initial level of the statutory minimum wage was determined by legislation, 
subsequent adjustments are to be determined by the social partners. In this regard, the Act 
makes provision for a minimum wage commission to review and – if necessary – adjust the 
present level.138 The commission comprises of six voting employer and trade union 
representatives (three each), a voting chair and two non-voting (advisory) members, selected 
from among the scientific community.139 As with effect from 1 January 2017, the minimum 
wage commission decided to increase the minimum wage from EUR 8.50 to EUR 8.84. 
According to section 9(1) MiLoG, the minimum wage commission must decide over further 
adjustments every two years, starting from 2017. 
 
3.3.2 Process of adjusting minimum wages 
 
During the process of adjusting, the minimum wage commission acts autonomously and is 
bound only by the requirements set by law.140 The process of examining whether and which 
adjustment of the minimum wage level is necessary includes the consultation of external 
scientific experts, employer and employee associations as well as other associations, which 
promote economic and social interests. In essence, the minimum wage commission has to 
evaluate which level would help to maintain appropriate minimum protection for workers, 
facilitate fair conditions for functioning competition and, at the same time, not jeopardise jobs. 
By doing so, the assessment must consider the development of collectively bargained pay 
scales in Germany.141 
Finally, the federal government is entitled to give legal force to the resolution provided by the 
commission after giving the relevant associations affected by the adjustment the possibility to 
comment.142 
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3.4 Monitoring and compliance 
 
To ensure compliance with the employers’ obligation to pay the statutory minimum wage, the 
act incorporates a framework to monitor and if necessary enforce compliance. 
Generally, there are three major sources of information concerning non-compliance: firstly, the 
results from monitoring and enforcement activities; secondly, the conclusion drawn from the 
data about wages beneath the minimum wage; and lastly evidence arising from qualitative 
research.143 
According to the MiLoG, the Financial Monitoring Unit for Illicit Employment 
(Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit – FKS), a special unit within the Customs Authority 
(Generalzolldirektion), is responsible to monitor compliance with the act and to enforce the 
law on illegal employment.144 The controls are part of the conducted employer inspections and 




There is agreement on the fact that a statutory minimum wage may have various impacts on 
the labour market, a country’s economy and working conditions. In the following, the most 
controversial and far-reaching effects of the German minimum wage will be presented.  
 
3.5.1 Employment effects 
 
Like in many other countries, even before the introduction and entry into force of the NMW, 
the fear of negative impacts on domestic employment gave rise to an intense debate among 
economists. 
As during the drafting of the 2016 Minimum Wage Report not enough reliable data was 
available, the report is not qualified for presenting an accurate picture on employment 
effects.146 While evaluating employment effects through a statutory wage floor, researchers 
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always have to bear in mind that besides the possible effects of the minimum wage, the 
economic circle, the demographic development as well as the technological change may 
influence the labour market and therefore must be taken into consideration. Therefore, to 
isolate minimum wage effects from other macroeconomic developments, researchers try to 
assess these effects by analysing regional and industry-specific data.147 Based on the data of 
the Federal Employment Agency (BA) which is also available regionally, a first serious 
assessment on employment effects was conducted.148  
As a result by mid-2017, the introduction of the statutory minimum wage did not contribute to 
adverse employment trends nor led to proven negative effect on unemployment.149 Moreover, 
the more a state or an industry was effected by the minimum wage, the stronger the increase in 
employment subject to social security deductions was. It is argued that the reason for this lay 
in the fact that numerous minijobs were transformed into employment subject to social security 
deductions.150 Contrary to the proponents concerns, the minimum wage may only be 
responsible for slight reduction in hires. Nevertheless, as enterprises apparently prefer to use 
non-employment adjustment channels like work intensity, selling prices or deferment of 
investments to adapt increased labour costs, mentionable negative employment effects cannot 
be detected.151 As examined by these researches, only a minority of enterprises considered such 
measures. 
 
3.5.2 Wage effects and low-wage sector 
 
The introduction of the minimum wage is often also described as a fairness issue. Low-paid 
workers should no longer work poor. Instead, the wage floor should maintain a wage level 
which ensures a certain way of participation in society.152 
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Although some of the enterprises effected by the new minimum wage legislation reduced 
recruitment, since 2015, the minimum wage led to a considerable wage increase for the relevant 
employees: their gross monthly earnings increased in average about twelve percent.153 
Particularly in Eastern Germany the minimum wage boosted earnings, especially for the low-
skilled workers, and those in atypical employment (e.g. mini-jobs, part-time work).154 
However, the goal to significantly reduce the low-wage sector has not been achieved so far, 
which researchers partly attribute to the fact that the threshold of low-pay has sharply increased 
in Germany and is regularly beneath the minimum wage level.155 
 
3.5.3 Economic effects 
 
On a macroeconomic basis, there is too little data so far to seriously determine clear effects of 
the NMW on employment costs, productivity and unit labour cost.156 In specific sectors, prices 
increased above average.157 However, these increases did not affect demand negatively.158 
Regarding the development of market entries, the NMW had no negative impacts so far.159 
Moreover, marginal employment was largely transformed into regular employment, which 
leads to positive effects on the welfare of workers and the social security system.160  
Nonetheless, negative side effects of the minimum wage may show up later as the German 
economy was performing strongly at the time the NMW was introduced.161 In 2015, the 
migrant crisis hit Germany strongly and still, a high number of low-skilled refugees is likely to 
enter the German labour market. Consequently, in future, wages of low-skilled employees 
could be negatively affected and fall.162 As the NMW would limit this decline, an adjustment 
of the minimum wage level should be considered to prevent increasing unemployment in this 
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group.163 Otherwise, people willing to work would try to undermine the minimum wage which 




The minimum wage can only be a successful tool if the employers comply with their obligation 
to respect the statutory wage floor. Therefore, in 2015, over 43,000 employers were monitored 
with a result of only 705 preliminary proceedings being initiated due to non-compliance with 
minimum wage obligations.165 However, trade unions were dissatisfied as they criticized 
inadequate monitoring of employers in low-wage sectors.166 
Depending on survey data, a mixed picture can be drawn. Accordingly, in mid-2015 between 
three to four percent of all employees were still paid inadequately; among marginal part-time 
employees some data recognise a very high percentage of non-compliance of nearly 50 percent, 
whereas other data only estimates thirteen percent.167 Taking into account the legal exemptions 
and measurement inaccuracies, one must admit that it is very sophisticated to estimate the exact 
extent of non-compliance. However, according to a new and serious study conducted by the 
independent German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), around 1.8 million 
entitled persons earned less than the statutory minimum wage in the first half of 2016.168 
 
3.6 Provisional evaluation 
 
The introduction of the minimum wage in Germany can only be assessed in context with its 
legislative package. So far, the MiLoG proved itself not as a bureaucratic monster as some 
prognosticated; nevertheless, many employers still complained about additional accounting 
work.169 No indications on negative impacts on employment or economy were found, moreover 
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a significant number of workers are at least entitled to claim higher earnings and had an actual 
wage increase.170 Although in 2016 an estimated number of 1.8 million earned less than the 
minimum wage, the rate of entitled persons earning too little declined more than one percent 
compared to 2015.171 However, they still make up seven percent of all entitled persons.172  
Although a wave of redundancies did not come up, other adjustment channels may lead to a 
certain increase of stress for employees. In addition, the low-wage sector did not decline 
substantially; plus - particularly in the services sector - prices for consumers increased. The 
latter, in turn, to a certain extend may be compensated through an additional gain in purchasing 
power due to the minimum wage.173  
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Fulfilling the ‘Agreement on the Introduction of a National Minimum Wage’ and considering 
the ‘Recommendations on Policy and Implementation’ to the Deputy President by the National 
Minimum Wage Panel, the Department of Labour published the (National Minimum Wage) 
Bill in November 2017 accompanied by the Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment 
Bill.174 
This chapter does not only present the Bill itself but also the existing wage-setting mechanism 
in South Africa to draw a complete picture of the future wage legislation. 
 
4.2 Existing wage-setting mechanisms 
 
At present, wages are set in South Africa collectively, either on a sectoral basis through 
collective agreements or through sectoral determinations. 
 
Collective bargaining can take place at plant or on sectoral level. The idea of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) was to especially promote centralized bargaining as a tool to 
guarantee fair working conditions and wages. Therefore, the drafters concentrated on 
bargaining at sectoral level within the framework of bargaining councils or statutory 
councils.175 Furthermore, the LRA provides the possibility to extend bargaining council 
agreements to non-parties if certain legal requirements are met.176 
 
According to the rules of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), sectoral 
determinations can be established on the recommendation of the Employment Conditions 
Commission (ECC) if there is no collective agreement coverage, this is because low levels of 
organisation and workers are deemed especially vulnerable to exploitation. The commissioners 
must act independently and shall not act as a representative of their constituencies.177 In 2014, 
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South Africa had 124 sectoral determinations amounting to the highest number of minimum 
wages in Africa.178  
 
Obviously, wages can also be negotiated individually, but nonetheless collective agreements 
supersede contracts of employment. Accordingly, the LRA clarifies that contracts of 
employment may not permit a worker less favourable wages than those prescribed by collective 




As indicated by its name, the minimum wage intends to set a wage floor for employees. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out by former President Zuma, the main purpose of introducing a 
minimum wage was predominantly to mitigate the unequal wage structure in South Africa.180 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, 60 percent of the total earnings belong to the top 20 percent of the 
wage earners whereas the bottom 60 percent only earn 20 percent of the total earnings. 
Additionally, in South Africa over 50 percent of the full-time workers are ‘working poor’, 
unable to bring themselves and their dependants out of poverty.181 Having in mind these 
circumstances, the minimum wage shall contribute to a change of the wage structure by 
increasing the earnings of the working poor and raising the labour share.182 Section 2 of the 
Bill summarizes the ultimate purpose of the Act: the acceleration of economic development 
and the improvement of social justice. Moreover, these overall goals are also reflected in 
section 7(a)(ii) and (iii) of the Bill, which rules the issues the National Minimum Wage 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’) shall bear in mind while conducting 
its annual review and recommending adjustments of the minimum wage. 
 
4.4 Scope and exemptions 
 
According to section 3 of the Bill, the statutory minimum wage shall apply  
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‘to all workers and their employers except members of the South African National Defence 
Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service.’  
 
As clarified in section 4(4) of the Bill 
 
‘payment of a national minimum wage cannot be waived and the national minimum wage takes 
precedence over any contrary provision in any contract, collective agreement or law, except a 
law amending this Act’.  
 
This broad coverage is accompanied by the possibility to apply for an exemption, stipulated in 
section 15 of the Bill. Unlike the German MiLoG, the Bill does not contain explicit exemptions 
but rather a general exemption mechanism, which entitles an employer or a registered 
employers’ organisation to apply for an exemption in case the requirements stated in section 
15(2) are met. It is striking that the Bill does not set up substantive criteria for granting 
exemptions. Applicants must only meet formal requirements, before the Minister of Labour 
(MoL) decides upon the application. However, according to section 16 of the Bill, the MoL 
may enact certain regulations alongside, including the ‘criteria that must be applied when 
evaluating exemption applications’. 
 
Concerning the components of the minimum wage section 5(1) of the Bill describes the 
remuneration as  
 
‘amount payable in money for ordinary hours of work excluding-  
(a)  any payment made to enable a worker to work including any transport, 
 equipment, tool, food or accommodation allowance;  
(b) any payment in kind including board or accommodation;  
(c)  gratuities including bonuses, tips or gifts; and  
(d) any other prescribed category of payment.’ 183  
 
In other words, the remuneration making up the minimum wage is paid for productivity and 
performance. Unlike some sectors, which are covered by collective agreements or sectoral 
determinations, premium payments and in-kind benefits are always excluded. 
                                                
183 Section 1 of the Bill defines ordinary hours of work as ‘the hours of work permitted in terms of section 






Section 6 of the Bill sets up the procedure for an annual review of the minimum wage level 
and possible adjustments to the initial level, stipulated in Schedule 1. In contrast to the German 
MiLoG, the South African Bill does not focus on explicit exemptions but rather follows the 
idea of a tiered minimum wage level considering special vulnerable groups of workers. 
Accordingly, section 2 of Schedule 1 of the Bill determines different minimum wages for farm 
workers, domestic workers, workers employed on an expanded public works programme and 
workers who have concluded learnership agreements.  
 
In accordance with ILO Convention No. 131, which makes regular adjustments of the 
minimum wage level compulsory, the Bill incorporates a legal framework thereto. Like 
Germany, instead of an automatic increase of wages, South Africa decided to implement an 
individual and flexible mechanism. As stated in section 6(1) and section 11(1), the Commission 
must regularly conduct a minimum wage review and provide recommendations for adjusting 
the level. Similar to the content of section 54(3) of the BCEA, section 7 of the Bill provides a 
non-exhaustible list of criteria, which the Commission must take into consideration during the 
process of drafting adjustment recommendations. These criteria include cost of living 
indicators, labour market indicators, economic circumstances and employers’ interests. 
Whereas chapter 3 of the Bill concerns the composition of the Commission and the selection 
of its members, ensuring the participation of all social partners, section 6 of the Bill rules the 
process of implementing adjustments. Thus, after having agreed on a specific recommendation, 
the Commission must forward it accompanied by its review to the Minister. In case the Minister 
agrees on the implementation of the recommendation, he must submit it to the Cabinet for 
approval. Finally, if also the Cabinet gives approval, the National Assembly must decide to not 








4.6 Compliance and enforcement 
 
4.6.1 Compulsory compliance  
 
The Bill does not contain provisions regarding the compliance and enforcement procedure of 
the new minimum wage legislation. However, the LRA and the BCEA provide a legal 
framework to protect and enforce workers’ rights. Protection against unfair labour practices is 
covered by the LRA, whereas the BCEA regulates and if necessary enforces the basic 
conditions of employment, including minimum wages. Accordingly, chapter 10 of the BCEA 
gives labour inspectors the right to enter workplaces to monitor and enforce compliance with 
labour laws and enact relevant orders to respond to wage violations. Moreover, the ECC is 
responsible to monitor compliance by obligating employers to keep employment records and 
provide copies for inspection and employees on request.184  
Section 4(6) of the Bill indicates that altering ‘wages, hours of work or other conditions of 
employment in connection with the implementation of the national minimum wage’ constitute 
an unfair labour practice. Consequently, legal protection under the provisions of the LRA do 
apply in this matter.  
 
4.6.2 Voluntary compliance 
 
To minimize the conduct of enforcement measures, incentives to strengthen voluntary 
compliance also play an important role.185 Currently, South Africa has no unified measures for 
incentivising compliance with sectoral determinations, albeit for some industries certain 
incentives have been implemented.186 The National Textile Bargaining Council (NTBC) or the 
National Bargaining Council for the Clothing and Manufacturing Industry (NBCCMI) 
annually for example provide certificates to enterprises who demonstrated compliance with 
labour standards.187 These certificates entitle employers to apply for loans at the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and qualify for rebates on import duties.188 Furthermore, 
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compliance certificates are needed to apply for the Department of Trade and Industry’s 




The new minimum wage legislation as stipulated in the Bill complements the existing sectoral 
minimum wages in South Africa. It incorporates a system of reviewing and adjusting the level 
of the minimum wage by establishing a minimum wage commission. The social partners are 
represented and get support by research scientists. Policy recommendations have broadly been 
considered as the essential components like exclusions and exemptions, reference periods or 
compliance measures attracted attention while drafting the Bill. However, the question arises, 
if the Bill has adequately taken domestic circumstances into consideration and therefore may 
achieve its objectives. This final assessment will be carried out in the following chapter. 
  




5. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSED BILL 
 
Although the Bill contains a wide-ranging legal framework to introduce a statutory minimum 
wage in South Africa, it is not as comprehensive as the German Minimum Wage Act. This 
chapter assesses the Bill by analysing probable impacts on employment, economy and social 
structure. Particularly, the presumable effectiveness of the legal possibilities will be evaluated 
by comparing the provisions of the Bill to those from its German counterpart. Always bearing 
in mind the different economic and social differences it will be shown that – despite some 
reasonable concerns – a new minimum wage act based on the Bill may indeed contribute to 
some of its goals. However, the findings indicate that the Bill could benefit from minor 
amendments and incorporating certain provisions contained in the German legislation. 
 
5.1 Challenges in South Africa 
 
Although South Africa became an emerging economy by undergoing a phase of economic and 
social development, it still faces serious challenges. Poverty remains the central problem. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, economic growth declined and aggravated the situation in the labour 
market. Unemployment, the phenomena of the working poor as well as structural domestic 
barriers are core issues which shall be enhanced by means of introducing a statutory minimum 
wage. However, other factors such as large household size creating very low average household 
income or global economic stagnation also have big influence on poverty.  
 
Regarding the present system of wage-setting, different problems occur. First to mention, there 
are still conflicts among employers and employers’ associations. For instance, the National 
Employers’ Association of South Africa (NEASA) did not accept an agreement set up by the 
Steel and Engineering Industry Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) and the National Union 
of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). Moreover, the NEASA alongside the United 
Textile and Clothing Association (UTCA) try to impede the extension of bargaining council 
agreements to non-parties.190 
Second, the legacy of the Marikana tragedy in August 2012, where 34 striking workers were 
killed by the police, reflects the deep-seated problems within industrial relations in South 
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Africa. Strike violence as experienced at Marikana is closely linked to high numbers of 
unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality characterizing the 
South African labour market.191 In that regard, just months before the Marikana tragedy 
Nicolson warned:  
 
‘If employees are working 14 hours a day for R4 500 per month, backed by a highly mobilised 
union and upset over the salary of executives, they'll strike, legal or not’.192  
 
Accompanied by other factors frustrating South African workers, including apparent 
intransigence of management, the protracted duration of the strike, a lack of strike pay and 
trade union support, strike violence still impedes collective bargaining and its idea of 
maintaining industrial peace. Especially with regard to Marikana, the role and loyalty of 
majority unions was debated intensively. Thus, many analysts were convinced that the relevant 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) contributed immensely to the tragic events.193 
Moreover, aiming that all workers ideally shall have a voice, the call for strengthening smaller 
unions got louder as workers lost faith in large unions during the negotiation process.194  
Thirdly, like in many other countries, the collective bargaining system in South Africa depends 
on effective organisation by workers. Among other difficulties to organize workers, global 
value chains pose a major challenge. The internationalisation of production gave rise to the 
concept of global commodity chains (GCCs). Contrary to the concept of Henry Ford, new 
technology makes it more efficient and cheaper to produce single component parts separately. 
The externalisation of processes established new forms of labour force, consisting of 
‘temporary, part-time and ‘self- employed’ workers under ‘personal contracts’’. This made 
collective bargaining and organising workers very difficult as these value chains cut numerous 
sectors with various employers being involved.195 
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To avoid an undermining of the minimum wage pay and to effectively enhance the wage 
situation of many workers, the minimum wage needs to have a broad coverage and should 




Generally, section 4 of the Bill stipulates a broad coverage as the minimum wage shall apply 
to every worker. However, as seen above, the Bill also includes tiered levels of minimum wages 
for certain groups of workers as well as the possibility of applying for an exemption. This 
model differs from the German approach, which incorporates universal coverage of a common 
wage accompanied by specific exclusions for groups which shall not enjoy minimum wage pay 
for different reason. In the following, it will be shown that the drafters of the Bill rightly decide 
to choose the tiered approach. Statutory minimum wages are a strict tool to regulate to labour 
market. Introducing them always pose the challenge to adequately accommodate the domestic 
low-wage sectors and carefully consider specific groups of workers and different types of 
businesses. Nevertheless, it seems not expedient to combine the tiers with a general exemption 
mechanism as this would jeopardise the universal coverage of the minimum wage. 
 
5.2.1.1 Multiple minimum wage rates 
 
The different minimum wage levels are listed in section 2 of Schedule 1 of the Bill. It is notable, 
that each group considered for differentiation by the Bill is also internationally recognised as 
specifically accessible for a different treatment. 196 Although the Bill does not exclude these 
groups from the application of the minimum wage act, it stipulates lower minimum wage tiers 
that can be phased out over time. Therefore, the term ‘exclusions’ might be a bit misleading.197 
Both, level differentiation and exclusions are considered to reduce negative impacts 
                                                
196 Agricultural workers, domestic workers, workers in public services and apprentices and trainees were 
specifically mentioned in the first report on the application of ILO Convention No. 131 (Minimum wage 
systems op cit note 78 at 37) and are in practice the most frequent groups excluded from minimum wage 
systems (The ‘ILO Minimum Wage Policy Guide’ [Geneva, ILO, 2016] 33). 
197 Konopelko precisely speaks of ‘“excluded sectors” [which] are not excluded entirely but rather have a 
differentiated minimum wage pegged to a certain percentage of the national minimum wage as part of a tiered 
national minimum wage system.’ (Elena Konopelko ‘Exclusions and Exemptions from a National Minimum 
Wage System’ Policy Brief#3 [Wits University 2016] 2). 
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particularly on employment in ultra-low wage sectors. The ILO does not prescribe a certain 
approach and highlights the different difficulties:  
 
‘While a system based on a single minimum wage may have the disadvantage of not reflecting 
the payment capacities of all employers across the country, it has the advantage of simplicity, 
which makes it easier for employers and workers to know the minimum wage rate applicable 
to a particular employment relationship, and for the labour inspection services to enforce the 
relevant provisions. On the contrary, the more complex a minimum wage system is, and the 
more sectoral, occupational and geographical rates it involves, the more difficult it is to 
monitor, particularly in countries where the labour administration services have very limited 
resources.’198 
 
Contrary to many other countries, South Africa only set up lower minimum wages for 
particular groups due to their specific job loss vulnerability.199 Given that often even 
industrialized countries still exclude industries from statutory minimum wages, the South 
African model offers at least minimum protection including the possibility for these groups to 
benefit from future wage adjustments. 
 
As pointed out by the ILO, simple minimum wage systems containing only one rate are easy 
to operate, communicate and enforce. Nevertheless, they offer less scope to consider specific 
economic circumstances within a country. 
A multiple system as chosen by South Africa therefore is easier to adopt to local circumstances 
of different industries. The Bill just mentions four different groups only entitled to claim a 
lower minimum wage.200 As a result, this makes the whole minimum wage system clear and 
easy to comply with. The occurrence of different rates depending on the sector of activity or 
state of education follows a certain logic, considering experts concerns while the minimum 
wage policy was designed. 
 
Based on the premise that  
 
                                                
198 Minimum wage systems op cit note 78 at 99. 
199 Ibid at 46. 
200 Section 2 of Schedule 1 of the Bill 
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‘[e]very worker has the right to the same minimum wage and workers and their families all 
have the same needs, independently of the sector of work’201, 
 
the ILO describes in its Policy Guide five major factors which may justify different minimum 
wage rates:  
 
‘Regional. There are significant regional differences in the cost of living, economic 
development, and labour market situation within a same country. 
Sector. Some sectors of activity have higher average productivity and "capacity to pay" than 
other sectors, and can afford higher minimum wages. 
Occupation. Certain occupations may be more skilled than others and workers in these 
occupations have a higher level of productivity. 
Enterprise size. Smaller enterprises may have lower productivity and subsequently a lower 
average capacity to pay. 
Population. A high general minimum wage may act as a barrier to the employment of the 
members of some groups such as young workers, trainees, or workers with disabilities.’202 
 
The Bill and its underlying policymakers considered these factors. Agriculture, domestic work 
and public employment programmes are among the most vulnerable sectors in terms of job 
losses as full-time workers earn very low wages.203 Excluding these key low-wage sectors from 
minimum wage pay would leave the most vulnerable workers behind, which would undermine 
the key issues to mitigate inequality and working poor. Therefore, it is reasonable to balance 
the risk of job loss due to the sectoral lack of capacity to pay and a minimum wage protection 
through introducing a tiered system. Moreover, international evidence has shown, that 
vulnerable workers in countries with tiered minimum wages use to have higher average wages 
compared to vulnerable workers in countries that exclude certain vulnerable sectors completely 
from the application of the minimum wage legislation.204 As long as a universal minimum wage 
is economically not bearable, a tiered system is more favorable than excluding entire sectors 
from the safety-net of minimum wages.205 
 
                                                
201 The ‘Minimum Wage Policy Guide’ (Geneva, ILO, 2016) 16. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Castel-Branco op cit note 177 at 14. 




Closely related to the criteria of productivity and occupation, the Bill stipulates other minimum 
wages for workers participating in learning programmes.206 There are two internationally 
recognised reasons for a differential treatment of that group: first, apprentices are learners not 
workers, who are getting trained and thus are less productive; second, employers shall 
continuously be incentivised to provide learning agreements.207 However, providing the same 
wages for learners as qualified workers has also various advantages:  
 
‘it ensures that workers who are undergoing training are not trapped in a cycle of working 
poverty and are able to meet their basic needs and those of their families; it removes the 
incentive to replace positions for qualified workers with learnerships, thus ensuring career 
progression for qualified workers; it reinforces the function of apprenticeships as an entry point 
into a long, productive career; and it reduces downward pressure on the wages of qualified 
workers.’208 
 
Having in mind these advantages it seems questionable if the inclusion of learners in the 
minimum wage system at lower wage tiers is reasonable. In that regard, Castel-Branco refers 
to various incentives offered by the South African government to employers in order to 
compensate potential extra costs due to lower productivity and training.209 Although one may 
argue that because of these existing incentives it is only fair to fully apply the minimum wage 
on learners, the Bill reasonably incorporates a special minimum wage mechanism for this 
group. According to section 2(d) of Schedule 1 combined with Schedule 2 of the Bill, learners 
are entitled to claim minimum allowanced, depending on their current level of qualification 
and personal performance. This tiered approach incentivises learners to perform properly and 
ensures a certain minimum wage level which is even higher than the NMW at a certain stage. 
Therefore, one can conclude that the Bill offers even more wage protection to learners than its 
German counterpart, which expressively excludes them from minimum wages.210 Furthermore, 
this qualification and performance-based approach takes into account the principle of ‘equal 
pay for equal work’ and incentivises employers to adjust wages of qualified workers adequately 
in relation to the statutory minimum allowances for learners. 
 
                                                
206 Section 2(d) of Schedule 1 of the Bill. 
207 Castel-Branco op cit note 177 at 15. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid at 16. 
210 See section 22(3) MiLoG. 
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To conclude, even though South Africa has chosen a contrary minimum wage system than 
Germany, the multiple minimum wage rates as stipulated in the Bill are in accordance with 
ILO and international standards. Apart from the civil servants enumerated in section 3, the Bill 
focuses rather on tiers than on specific exclusions from the minimum wage.211 This is a 
challenging approach for an emerging economy like South Africa but may be more promising 
in terms of poverty alleviation than excluding vulnerable low-wage sectors completely from 
the safety net established through a minimum wage. As a positive, this system of tiered 
minimum wages cannot be used as an excuse to create an ultra-low NMW and allows some 
flexibility.212 Moreover, the social partners can still set higher wages than the NMW by 
concluding collective agreements. 
 
5.2.1.2 Exemptions upon application 
 
Contrary to exclusions, exemptions release individual employers from their obligation to pay 
the full statutory minimum wage for a certain period of time.213 The intention of exemptions is 
to bridge the transition phase until an employer has built up capacity to pay the minimum 
wage.214 
Whereas the German MiLoG focuses on exclusions for certain groups, the Bill incorporates a 
legal framework, which provides every employer or employers’ organisation registered in 
terms of section 96 of the LRA the possibility to apply for an exemption from paying the NMW. 
To effectively pursue its objective of primarily being a social protection and poverty reduction 
mechanism, the ILO recommends establishing a NMW coverage as wide as possible. In that 
regard, the ILO further states that  
 
‘[i]n order for the minimum wage to be an effective policy of social development, the number 
of exemptions and exclusions should be as few as possible (ILO, 2014)’.215 
 
Considering this recommendation, a general exemption mechanism as stipulated in the Bill 
might pose the risk of being a gateway to undermine the minimum wage coverage. South Africa 
                                                
211 Although civil servants often get paid more than the minimum wage, pre-existing administrative 
arrangements that rule wages and other labour-related procedures do not reasonably explain their exclusion from 
minimum wage protection (Konopelko op cit note 197 at 6). 
212 Konopelko op cit note 197 at 3. 
213 Ibid at 2. 
214 Castel-Branco op cit note 177 at 13. 
215 Konopelko op cit note 197 at 2. 
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is still an emerging economy facing key challenges such as very high levels of unemployment, 
inequality and low economic growth. This having been recognised, the relevant provisions 
must be evaluated. 
Internationally, the combination of exclusions, exemptions, and differentiated minimum wages 
is a common approach. In terms of an exemption mechanism for employers one can distinguish 
between provisions granting exemptions for (a) vulnerable or special employers like family 
businesses, small enterprises or charitable organisations and (b) ‘special economic reasons’ on 
a case-by-case basis.216 Accordingly, the South African exemption mechanism, which is 
inspired by the existing mechanism in the LRA and the BCEA can be assigned to the latter. 
Although a general exemption mechanism logically poses the risk of narrowing down the 
minimum wage coverage, it may be expedient as long as the legal provisions are shaped 
properly to avoid abuse. To assess whether this mechanism may in fact be useful one must 
examine and evaluate its advantages and disadvantages. 
 
It is without doubt, that paying minimum wages is currently unaffordable at least for some 
employers due to various - predominantly economic - reasons. Instituting exemptions on 
application creates one possibility to assist these employers during their transition period to the 
national minimum wage system. The exemption system as stipulated in section 15 of the Bill 
gives the Minister autonomy and flexibility to decide on exemption policies and applications 
on case-by-case basis considering industry-specific factors. 
 
However, still, the key question remains how to ensure that only those employers who cannot 
afford to implement the minimum wages obtain an exemption. Granting exemptions upon 
application is a familiar approach in international practice.217 Universally, applicants must 
substantiate their claim that paying minimum wages is unaffordable for good reason. It is 
problematic, however, to establish specific criteria and requirements which must be met to 
obtain an exemption. In that regard, the Bill is not specific, however it does provide that the 
Minister may issue regulations concerning the form and way exemptions must be made, 
including the procedure and content of the application and the criteria that must be applied 
while evaluating these applications.218 Internationally, common criteria are the number of 
                                                
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid at 12. 
218 Section 16(1)(a) of the Bill. 
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employees, annual turnover and family relationships accompanied by the requirement of 
financial documentation proving ‘unaffordability’.219  
Assuming these criteria would become common practice over time in South Africa, abuse still 
would not be unlikely. Regarding the number of employees, evidence is given that exemptions 
based on that criteria tend to create disincentives for small enterprises to grow and employ 
more workers because by doing so they would become subject to national minimum wage 
legislation.220 In addition, some South African industries predominantly consist of small 
companies.221 Employers in these sectors could illegally mask employees as volunteers or 
interns to undermine the minimum wage application.222 Thus, that criterion risks to introduce 
a de-facto blanket exclusion for workers in small enterprises, contrary to the minimum wage 
idea to set a decent wage floor. However, the idea to take a company’s’ turnover as a basis is 
also not unproblematic as some enterprise may provide illegal accounting schemes to hide their 
real turnover. In South Africa, corruption is still a structural problem which does not exclude 
the public sector and therefore may foster the abuse of illegally granting applications.223 
On the other hand, the Bill incorporates some simple provisions to restrict possible abuse. 
According to section 15(2)(a) of the Bill, applicants can only apply for permission to not pay 
the (full) minimum wage for no longer than one year. Consequently, the granting expires after 
a limited period and a new assessment must be conducted. Moreover, in case of a successful 
application, the employer is not free to decide unilaterally how much he is willing to pay 
because the granting must specify the wage and needs to contain ‘other relevant condition’. 
Besides, regulations constituting procedures and assessment criteria can only be issued by the 
Minister after consulting NEDLAC and where appropriate the Commission.224 Furthermore, to 
ensure public transparency, the Minister must publish the final drafts and enable participation 
of interested parties.225 
However, international experience has been made with exemption systems designed for small 
and medium-sized enterprises, which claimed that minimum wage pay would be unaffordable 
for economic reasons.226 Here, the general exemption system goes beyond and is not 
                                                
219 Konopelko op cit note 197 at 12. 
220 Ibid at 11. 
221 E.g. textile sector (ibid at 12). 
222 According to the Low Pay Commission Report 2015, this has been documented in the UK (ibid at 11). 
223 Gareth Newham ‘Why is Corruption is Getting Worse in South Africa’ Corruption Watch 17 January 2014, 
available at http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/why-is-corruption-getting-worse-in-south-africa/, accessed on 7 
January 2018. 
224 Section 16(1) of the Bill. 
225 Section 16(2) of the Bill. 
226 Konopelko op cit note 197 at 12. 
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exhaustible in terms of possible applicants and relevant reasons for granting exemptions. A 
general look at the domestic exemption practice under the rules of the LRA and the BCEA 
however raises serious doubt that this exemption-upon-application approach suits best for 
South Africa. So far, neither the Department of Labour, nor bargaining councils have issued 
clear and specific criteria for exemptions and related special indicators to weigh them 
adequately.227 Having in mind the vague criteria used for assessment and the lack of 
transparency concerning the reasons why some exemptions are granted while others were not, 
it is surprising that the success rate of exemption applications stays constantly high.228  
 
To conclude, some major problems raised by the current South African exemption mechanism 
are addressed by the Bill, including the establishment of criteria for exemptions, the body 
responsible for assessment or transparency issues. However, serious concerns regarding large 
scale exemptions still remain. This leads to the result that due to extremely low wages and high 
risks of abuse, at present, South Africa does not have the ideal conditions to implement an 
exemption-upon-application mechanism for the NMW.  
 
It can be assumed that this new application mechanism predominantly will be used as a 
business-related exemption possibility as research attested that over 80 percent of exemption 
applications under the present framework come from small and medium-sized enterprises.229 
Considering the costs arising through the administration and enforcement system, the concerns 
stated above and the initial purpose of the exemption mechanism, a better and simple solution 
would be to include certain businesses in the tiers with an option of phasing out. This approach 
would make a general exemption mechanism dispensable and ensures minimum protection to 
a certain scale by allowing some businesses to pay only a specified lower proportion of a 
general minimum wage. In default of a hardship provision for vulnerable employers, the South 
African legislator should instead concentrate on providing the possibility to apply for special 
government grants. This approach would reduce the risk of abuse and would shift it from 
employees earning the lowest wages towards the state. A continuous obligation for employers 
to provide financial documentation proving ‘unaffordability’, possible sanctions in case of 
abuse and part-repayment obligations could complete a legal framework for government 
grants.  
                                                








Another important factor concerning the efficiency of the Minimum Wage Act is the 
composition of the minimum wage itself. The ILO understands wages to be the payment, an 
employer makes to his employees in return for their work performance by stating that   
 
‘...the term wages means remuneration or earnings, however designated or calculated, capable 
of being expressed in terms of money and fixed by mutual agreement or by national laws or 
regulations, which are payable in virtue of a written or unwritten contract of employment by an 
employer to an employed person for work done or to be done or for services rendered or to be 
rendered’.230 
 
Generally, total wages or earnings consist of different components. Apart from basic pay, 
wages often include regular bonuses, in kind benefits or special performance pay.231 This 
having been said, it becomes clear that depending on the components which count towards 
compliance with the minimum wage, the payments for workers may vary due to employers’ 
practice to remunerate.  
 
By excluding any kind of payment rewarding other matters than productivity and performance 
as well as remuneration in kind, section 5 of the Bill narrows down the elements making up 
the minimum wage to the basic pay.  
 
Payments in-kind may limit or decrease the financial income of workers in case they are 
inappropriate for the personal use or if their value does not compensate the value attributed. To 
avoid this risk of abuse, section 5(1) of the Bill prohibits in-kind payments to be considered as 
part of the minimum wage. This prohibition policy is meaningful as employers do not have the 
possibility to undermine minimum pay by providing non-cash benefits to employees which 
might lead to a total income that does not cover the basic costs of living. 
Unlike the Bill, the German MiLoG does not explicitly define the elements of the minimum 
wage. This lack of clarity was even objective to a decision of the Federal Labour Court which 
                                                
230 Article 1 of the ILO Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95) 
231 Collective bargaining: a policy guide op cit note 92 at 10. 
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identified that even remuneration in kind (such as company car use or meal vouchers) may be 
part of the minimum wage as long as it rewards work performance.232  
 
5.3 Minimum wage level 
 
It is without doubt that a crucial issue within the minimum wage policy lies in the level of the 
minimum wage. Hence, it will be examined if the levels have been set adequately according to 
South African circumstances. Subsequently, focus will be put on the mechanism to adjust these 
levels before assessing whether it is expedient to set up the levels for hourly minimum wages. 
 
5.3.1 Tiered system 
 
Minimum wages always face the challenge of on the one hand establishing a decent wage floor 
to ensure the lowest paid workers’ basic needs and being economically affordable for 
employers on the other.  
As already mentioned, with Schedule 1 as adjusted in terms of section 6, the Bill incorporates 
four different national minimum wage tiers ranking from R11 to R20 and a special calculation 
base for workers who have concluded learnership agreements.  
 
5.3.1.1 Balanced and evidence-based approach 
 
The balanced and evidence-based approach is commonly recognised. It has its legal basis in 
article 3 of the ILO’s Minimum Wage Fixing Convention No. 131, which emphasizes that  
 
‘[t]he elements to be taken into consideration in determining the level of minimum wages shall, 
so far as possible and appropriate in relation to national practice and conditions, include – 
 
(a) the needs of workers and their families, taking into account the general level of  
wages in the country, the cost of living, social security benefits, and the relative living 
standards of other social groups; 
(b) economic factors, including the requirements of economic development, levels of 
productivity and the desirability of attaining and maintaining a high level of 
employment.’ 
                                                




The needs of workers are usually measured by using poverty lines or living wage benchmarks. 
Whereas the former often gets estimated by defining low pay as wages below two third of 
median wage, the latter gets calculated by considering daily average costs for a basic living 




According to Schedule 1 of the Bill, the general NMW amounts R20 per hour, which is 
equivalent to approximately R3,500 per month. This amount is based on a 40-hour working 
week with a daily work of eight hours. The determination of a meaningful level for the NMW 
requires the consideration of four major aspects: (1) the wage distribution in South Africa; (2) 
basic living expenses; (3) employment effects; and (4) economic affordability for employers.234 
As indicated in Section 2.2.2, nearly 50 percent of all employed people earn less than R3,500 
per month and nearly 35 percent earn even less than R2,500 per month. These figures show 
that an hourly wage of R20 leads to a significant wage increase for many workers. 
Basic living expenses are the needs of workers as understood by the ILO. Considering 
household size and the fact that in South Africa many households are dependent on only one 
earner, a monthly minimum wage at R4,050 would be needed to lift the families belonging to 
the quintile with the lowest income out of poverty.235 Consequently, a minimum wage of R20 
would not directly lift them out of poverty but though would enhance their living conditions 
noticeably. The second quintile will be offered the chance to exceed the poverty line. 
Supporting this approach, the Provincial Secretary of the Young Communist League in 
Gauteng Mdakane confirmed:  
 
‘While the proposed R3 500 can't lift the poorest South Africans out of crippling poverty, it 
would go a long way in offering relief to 41.6 percent of workers earning less than R3 000 a 
month.’236 
 
                                                
233 NMW Panel Report op cit note 28 at 26. 
234 Castel-Branco op cit note 177 at 7. 
235 According to the numbers of the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU), 2016, this quintile had an 
average household size of 5.2 and a monthly household income of R1,671 (NMW Panel Report op cit note 28 at 
65). 
236 Tim Forstall ‘South Africa's Bad Decision On The R 3,500 Minimum Wage - It's Too High’ Forbes 21 
November 2016, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/11/21/south-africas-bad-decision-
on-the-r-3500-minimum-wage-its-too-high/#4307d8df762f, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
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Possible employment effects play a major role while examining an initial minimum wage level. 
As it is very difficult to precisely predict employment impacts, concerns should neither be 
overstated nor underestimated. Domestically and internationally researchers present different 
findings.237 However, there is agreement on the fact that minimum wages if set far too high 
will impede employment.  
With regard to the huge wage inequality, the heterogeneity of wages and the immense low-
wage sector which characterises the South African labour market, some experts are concerned 
that the majority of businesses will not accept the minimum wage at that level due to the rise 
in costs.238 Their argumentation line is based on the low economic job value which does not 
allow a minimum wage level to that extent.239 The economic job value is determined by the 
amount an employer is willing to pay to get benefit out of the labour. This amount in turn, 
depends on the local productivity of labour. Regarding an adequate level, the guideline being 
used clarifies that minimum wages should never exceed the threshold of 45 to 50 percent of 
the median wage; otherwise they are set too high and cause job loose.240 Referring to the 
countries low employment-to-population ratio, proponents criticise that in South Africa wage 
levels are already too high for local productivities.241 The assessment that productivity of 
labour must rise can be supported by taking a look at the Global Competitiveness Index. 
Accordingly, South Africa has its worsts results in terms of labour market efficiency, including 
the categories ‘pay and productivity’ and ‘flexibility of wage determination’.242 
Nevertheless, the Panel claimed that it sufficiently considered economic and affordability 
criteria, including the mean and median wage level. Hence, according to their guideline  
 
‘[national minimum wages] can be as high as one times the median and as low as 0.32 time the 
median.’243 
 
A monthly wage of R3,500 would amount 0.33 of the mean and 0.67 of the median wage.244 
Considering the ratios to means and median observed internationally by the ILO, the NMW 
would clearly not exceed the maximum levels in emerging economies. Given that minimum 
                                                
237 NMW Panel Report op cit note 28 at 74. 
238 Sam Mkokeli & Mike Cohen ‘Minimum wage: SA moves to calm labour market’ Business Report 22 
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240 Forstall ob cit note 236. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Klaus Schwab ‘The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017’ (World Economic Forum 2016) 325. 
243 NMW Panel Report op cit note 28 at 68. 
244 Ibid at 70. 
 
 54 
wage levels are always a matter of dispute among economists and hardly predictable in terms 
of employment effects in case they are not set evidently too high, R20 seem legitimate 
particularly in international comparison. Even if there will be small negative impacts on 
employment in certain industries, these effects would probably neither threaten 
macroeconomic balance nor impede economic growth.245 Instead, the NMW has the potential 
to stimulate overall macro- and micro-economic effects.246 Weighted against possible positive 
contributions towards poverty alleviation, income equality and economic growth, the wage 
level tend to be an acceptable trade-off.  
 
In addition to the general minimum wage level of R20, the Bill sets up special wage-tiers for 
domestic workers, workers in agriculture and workers employed on an expanded public works 
programme.  
Agriculture and domestic work are among the sectors with the highest number of workers 
earning below R20 per hour.247 Having additionally the lowest average income, both sectors 
would experience a significant wage bill increase of over 30 percent in comparison to other 
sectors which have a wage bill rise of only 10 percent.248 As a result, it becomes evident that 
these two sectors need differential treatment to lessen negative employment effects due to 
unaffordability. As domestic workers have a lower average wage income than farm workers, 
the tiered wages of R18 and R15 are justified and expedient. Although it may seem ethically 
not fair to pay the lowest wage-earners less than others, it is essential to not risk their vulnerable 
jobs with good intention. Similar approaches are also conducted internationally: whereas 
twelve percent of all minimum wage countries even excluded these sectors from minimum 
wage application, it is common practice to adopt tiered wages amounting between 60 and 80 
percent of the NMW.249 
Regarding workers employed on an expanded public works programme, a lower minimum 
wage level is reasonable due to the programmes intention of providing work and training 
opportunities for unemployed people to alleviate poverty and unemployment. Besides, every 
year over one million temporary workers participating in this programme only earn a daily 
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wage of R75.250 As it is therefore not possible to immediately include them into the general 
minimum wage level, it is though fair to introduce a tier which indicates that they are not ‘left 
behind’.  
 
Given that exemptions from general minimum wage pay presumably are intended for smaller 
businesses and financially weak employers, the tiers stipulated in the Bill are not complete.251 
Unlike the German MiLoG, the Bill did not integrate volunteers and interns in its tier-system. 
As these types of employment typically get very low or even no wages, an adjustment would 
be necessary in case legislation will be implemented without a general exemption mechanism.  
Moreover, clarification would be desirable regarding the fact that minimum levels generally 
refer to gross wages and that existing tiers shall be gradually phased out over time. 
 
5.3.2 Adjustment mechanism 
 
Politics, inflation increase and other changing circumstances have effects on wages.252 As 
changing conditions or negative impacts on the labour market may harm the effectiveness of a 




Consistent with the balanced and evidence-based approach for the initial wage setting, section 
7 of the Bill sets up the major factors which must be considered while drafting an adjustment 
recommendation. In contrast to a simple formulaic mechanism, these factors urge the 
Committee to focus evidence based on the monitored minimum wage impacts as well as the 
current labour market situation, economy and living expenses. This mechanism was proposed 
by the Panel, which justified their view by stating that a specific mathematical formula is not 
able to supersede social dialogue and predict future challenges.253 Like section 9(2) and (4) of 
the MiLoG, the Bill refers to the key issues to which the Committee must give attention to: 
first, the needs of employees; second, the affordability of employers; and third, the 
macroeconomic environment.254 Having in mind the complexity of the South African labour 
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market and economic difficulties, this flexible approach cannot be criticised and seems 
reasonable.  
To ensure the participation of the social partners, the Bill establishes a Commission consisting 
of employers’ and employees’ representatives as well as members of organised community and 
supporting independent experts. Like Germany and nearly 50 percent of the countries with 
minimum wage legislation, South Africa decided to adopt a mechanism which requires the 
executive to adjust the minimum wage following consultation or recommendation of a 
specialised body.255 The decision-making process in South Africa is transparent and 
comprehensive. Whereas in Germany the government is entitled to give force to the 
Commissions’ recommendation, in South Africa, the Commission must justify and clarify its 
recommendation upon the Ministers’ request. A ‘tripartite minimum wage fixing machinery’ 
is typically characterised by the fact that the Commission is the decision-making authority in 
case of disagreement with the executive on the fixing of the minimum wage level.256 The Bill, 
however, stipulates that even though the executive cannot amend the Commissions’ final 
recommendation, it must approve it before the legislative finally must authorize the adjustment 
by not issuing a contrary resolution.257 This procedure ensures not only participation of the 
social partners but also reciprocal control of all institutions involved. In comparison to the 
German mechanism, the Bill enables the legislature to intervene ultimately.  
 
The German model is based on strong confidence to the decision-making Committee and 
particularly the social partner. Although an implementation of the recommendation through the 
executive is needed to give legal effect to the minimum wage level amendment, this executive 
act is in fact a matter of form. In practice, the executive is bound to the recommendation and 
not entitled to disapprove it.258 This mechanism ensures that the decision-making power 
belongs to the social partners, which not only have expertise but also a strong interest in a fair 
outcome. Advisory members of the Committee contribute during the process of adjustment 
with their special economic expertise. In case of a tie, the chairperson who is appointed by the 
government upon the joint proposal of the central employer and employee organisations, shall 
decide independently.259 As there is no need of further confirmation of the recommendation, 
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the process is time-effective and guarantees a well-grounded periodic adjustment of the 
minimum wage level. 
In comparison to the German model, the Bill proposes a slightly different adjustment 
mechanism based on governments’ approval and control through the National Assembly. On 
the one hand, this approach provides a high level of democratic legitimation and may intercept 
recommendations in case of obvious misjudgement by the Committee. On the other hand, in 
stating the Cabinets’ approval as a prerequisite, section 6 of the Bill simultaneously enables 
the Cabinet to disapprove the recommendation with the consequence that the Minister cannot 
table the amended Schedules in the National Assembly. To conclude, the Cabinet has the power 
to block every amendment recommended by the Committee which may leave minimum wage 
adjustments very exposed to volatility. To avoid the risk that employers may eventually 
exercise influence over the Cabinet to hinder the implementation of amendments for economic 
reasons, it would be preferable to only give the Cabinet a right to comment on 
recommendations instead of a right to block them. Due to its function and size and the fact that 
it represents the society as a whole, the National Assembly is less vulnerable to external 
influence. Therefore, exclusive verification through the National Assembly would be sufficient 
for having a final scrutiny role in place. 
 
5.3.2.2 Frequency of adjustment  
 
Whereas section 9(1) of the MiLoG states an adjustment interval of two years, section 6 of the 
Bill stipulates an annual review of the minimum wage level. Most countries decided on an 
annual adjustment mechanism due to an estimated low and stable domestic inflation rate.260 
According to the Panels expertise  
 
‘South Africa’s inflation rates are stable enough to warrant a regular review period of the NMW 
and adjustments to the level that consider a broader range of factors than the inflation rate.’261 
 
Following this opinion, regular annual review accompanied by an adjustment recommendation 
is expedient as it ensures planning reliability for employers and employees as well as consistent 
response to changing circumstances. Furthermore, in contrast to a flexible rhythm of 
adjustment, an institutionalized annual adjustment mechanism can prevent deflationary wage 
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261 Ibid at 84. 
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developments and mobilize union members to campaign for adequate adjustments of minimum 
wages.262 
 
5.3.3 Minimum wage units 
 
Concerning the question over what time period minimum wage rates shall be calculated, 
Germany and South Africa both decided on an hourly basis. Generally, minimum wages can 
be set for various time periods with different advantages and disadvantages.  
A single hourly wage is transparent and clear and therefore simpler to monitor in terms of 
compliance.263 Additionally, employees are actually paid the minimum wage for every hour 
worked. However, introducing minimum wages on an hourly basis is particularly contentious 
because of the concern that employers may undermine the intended income increase for 
employees through a substantial reduction in working hours and a reorganisation of 
employment contracts.264 Especially in sectors predominantly consisting of casualised and 
seasonal work, workers receiving the minimum wage would have to be afraid of having less 
income at the end of the month than before the minimum wage introduction.  
To avoid this, a monthly or weekly rate paid in exchange for ordinary hours of work of a full-
time employee, as specified in the national labour laws seems useful. Although, setting longer 
reference periods may ensure that employees do have enough income to meet their basic needs, 
these reference periods easily result in unpaid overtime for workers.265 
With regard to minimum wages set by sectoral determinations, South Africa already 
implemented various measures to ensure that an hourly minimum wage does not reduce the 
overall income of workers. Accordingly, inter alia higher wage rates for part-time workers or 
compulsory payments for a minimum number of working hours were established.266 The 
current approach as stipulated in the Bill, however, differs. To minimize the risk for workers 
of gaining less overall income due to the hourly minimum wage section 4(6) of the Bill rules 
that  
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‘[i]t is an unfair labour practice for an employer to unilaterally alter wages, hours of work or 
other conditions of employment in connection with the implementation of the national 
minimum wage […]’.  
 
This provision is presumably well-reasoned. On the one hand, by generally qualifying certain 
adjustment channels as unfair labour practices, workers have the possibility to effectively 
legally protect their right to earn the minimum wage under consistent working conditions. On 
the other hand, employers who can prove that they cannot afford the increased wages proposed 
still have the option to adequately channel these additional costs through reorganisation of 
employment. In that case, an unfair labour practice (e.g. unilateral alterations to working hours) 
would be justified as an adjustment of employment conditions undoubtedly is preferable to a 
termination of employment.  
This mechanism differentiates from the general exemption mechanism as proposed in section 
15 of the Bill. Whereas the latter entitles the employer to pay less than the minimum wage at 
equal working time, the former still ensures that the employee get paid the minimum wage for 
every hour worked. In case an employer reduces working hours, he consequently gets less 
rendered work performance. Therefore, he will probably use this measure only if it is truly 
necessary. Taken together, the provision is well-balanced by addressing both, employers’ and 
employees’ interests. 
In contrast, the MiLoG does not generally prohibit the unilateral altering of working hours in 
connection with the implementation of the NMW. Nevertheless, under German labour law, the 
employer is not entitled to do so without permission of the employee concerned. In case the 
employer issues a dismissal for variation of contract he needs to meet the strict requirements 
of social justification. Given that employees are already protected by existing labour 
legislation, further regulation within the MiLoG is superfluous.  
 
5.4 Monitoring and compliance 
 
5.4.1 International perspective and experiences in South Africa 
 
The results which may be achieved by introducing a NMW obviously depend on employers’ 
compliance with their obligation to pay the hourly minimum wage. As indicated by the ILO, 
high rates of non-compliance do not only harm the workers concerned, but also adversely 
affects compliant employers, as non-compliant employers receive an illegitimate cost 
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advantage.267 Acknowledging that the extent of non-compliance not only depends on the 
minimum wage level, but also on the legal framework and supporting policies, article 5 of the 
Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131) emphasises that  
 
‘[a]ppropriate measures, such as adequate inspection reinforced by other necessary 
measures, shall be taken to ensure the effective application of all provisions relating to 
minimum wages.’ 
 
More precisely, in paragraph 14, the Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation, 1970 (No. 135) 
itemizes measures that countries should incorporate in their minimum wage legislation in order 
to ensure the effective application of all provisions relating to minimum wages. This includes 
inter alia an effective monitoring system, targeted labour inspections, penalties as a deterrent 
to non-compliant employers and a simple procedure of legal protection for workers. 
So far, South Africa can be described as a country with a rather low-compliance rate. According 
to statistical estimates, it had a compliance rate of less than 60 percent in the mid-2000s with a 
further decline in the late 2000s to about 50 percent.268 In 2011, non-compliance was not only 
varying across sectors, but was also significantly higher in rural areas and among 
disadvantaged groups.269 Bearing in mind these figures, it is obvious that the new minimum 
wage legislation needs to ensure higher rates of compliance. 
As emphasized in section 4.6, a comprehensive approach includes both, incentives to 
strengthen voluntary compliance as well as effective monitoring and enforcement measures. 
The legal framework provided in the LRA and the BCEA to protect workers against unfair 
labour practices and enforcement of their rights, already include various measures proposed by 
paragraph 14 of the Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation No. 135. The BCEA entitles 
labour inspectors to enter workplaces and stipulates that the ECC shall conduct further 
monitoring measures.270  In addition, the LRA procedure for unfair labour practices is extended 
by the Bill to certain practices related to the NMW. Besides, South Africa implemented 
measures to incentivise voluntary compliance. 
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Nevertheless, the high rates of non-compliance show that the framework is in practice is not as 
efficient as it is supposed to be. Regarding the new NMW, non-compliance may occur in 
different forms. Instead of simply not paying the hourly minimum wage, employers may also 
undermine minimum wage pay through unpaid overtime pay or other impermissible adaptation 
measures.271 To reduce non-compliance, it might therefore be useful to incorporate several 
provisions of the MiLoG to the new South African minimum wage legislation as well. 
 
5.4.2 Incorporation of MiLoG provisions 
 
Generally, the Bill has been framed rather clear and simple. Schedule 1 contains a manageable 
wage tiers and section 1 defines the relevant terms to avoid misinterpretation. Additionally, the 
decision to introduce a NMW on an hourly basis enhances compliance as it bolsters simplicity 
for both, employers and employees. However, in comparison to the MiLoG, the Bill remains 
silent on several procedures which can facilitate compliance.  
As already proposed by the ILO, minimum wage legislation should also include possible 
penalties for non-compliant employers. These penalties can be tiered depending on the gravity 
of the non-compliance with the act. Hence, flexible provisions like section 21 and 19 of MiLoG 
can act as a model for a legal sanction regime. In this respect, the South African legislator 
already decided to insert section 76A in the BCEA, ruling that  
 
‘a fine that may be imposed on an employer who paid an employee less than the national 
minimum wage, is an amount that is the greater of- 
(a) twice the value of the underpayment; or 
(b) twice the employee’s monthly wage.’ 
 
It remains to be seen whether this provision evolves a deterrent nature. In any case, the open 
wording of section 76A only sets a floor amount and provides an opportunity to adjust possible 
sanctions. 
Furthermore, the establishment of an information centre as stipulated in section 12(3) of 
MiLoG should have been added to the Bill by extending the function of the secretariat to the 
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Commission in section 13. This is an essential feature as international evidence has shown the 
importance of making information on minimum wage legislation available to employers, 
workers and the public.272 Thus, with public awareness about applicable minimum wage rates, 
public monitoring and possible penalties for non-compliance, compliance may be higher. The 
high numbers of non-compliance have shown that the current approach to delegate this 
essential task to labour inspectors was not satisfying and therefore needs to be amended.273  
Lastly, section 17 of MiLoG provides a special provision regarding special monitoring 
procedures for sectors with potentially high rates of non-compliance. Accordingly, employers 
who employ workers in specific low-wage sectors listed in section 8(1) of Volume IV of the 
Social Insurance Code (Viertes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch – SGB IV) and in section 2a of the Act 
to Combat Clandestine Employment (Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz - SchwarzArbG) are 
obliged to record commencement, end and duration of their employees’ daily working time. 
Moreover, these records must be kept at the disposal for at least two years. This documentation 
requirements facilitate the control mechanism for authorities, especially in those sectors which 
are of particular importance due to low average wages and often missing written employment 
contracts. It might therefore be useful to integrate a similar provision either in Chapter 10 of 
the BCEA or into the National Minimum Wage Act itself. 
 
Nevertheless, as emphasised in section 3.5.4, in Germany an unexpected large number of 
entitled persons earn less than the minimum wage. This number however declined but still 
shows that imperfections subsist as regards to the control and penalty mechanisms of the 
MiLoG.  
Whereas on the one hand, the MiLoG provides important tools to enforce its obligations, it 
becomes very clear that it is equally important to efficiently implement these tools in practice. 
Therefore, in Germany the call for more frequent controls, more dissuasive and rapid sanctions, 
more efficient complaint procedures and more stringent requirements for the documentation 
systems (especially timekeeping) have become louder.274 
South Africa may benefit not only by considering adding these legal tools incorporated in the 
MiLoG, but also by allocating the corresponding financial and practical means. This would 
include hiring sufficient qualified personnel to effectively conduct inspections and 
enforcement. As monitoring measures are time-intensive, in Germany they predominantly are 
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conducted in a risk-based manner, which means that they apply more often in industries where 
serious infringements are expected.275 Consequently, critics complain, this procedure ‘does not 
guarantee a systematic and comprehensive assessment of whether or not the minimum wage 
law is actually being applied’.276 Thus, the hiring of sufficient qualified personnel would ensure 
a more accurate assessment. 
 
5.5 Alternative instruments 
 
The introduction of a NMW is traditionally a highly contentious policy approach. 
Consequently, this section addresses the question whether other labour market policies may 
contribute more efficiently to the alleviation of inequality. Subsequently, it will be concluded 
that a combination of instruments adopted to South African circumstances presumably can be 
described as most effective and promising. 
 
5.5.1 Labour market policies 
 
Worldwide, minimum wage policies were introduced in order to respond to changing income 
distribution, which was thought could not be dealt sufficiently through the existing framework 
of the labour market policies and the institutions governing collective bargaining.277 Among 
other factors, the decline in the wage share, the increasing wage dispersion and public 
expenditure policies which presumably mostly privileged the rich were identified as drivers 
facilitating wage inequality.278 
As mentioned above, in South Africa, a lot of workers earn very low wages. Shifting wages 
towards a level that people can take care of themselves and their dependents is therefore a key 
issue.  
At present, collective agreements, extensions thereof and sectoral determinations constitute the 
main tools to set up wages collectively. However, several barriers (e.g. lack of coverage, 
declining trade union power, difficult industrial relations, high rates of non-compliance) 
impede these tools from achieving satisfactory results for all workers. Consequently, like in 
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many other countries, experts discuss the adequate labour market policy to overcome these 
barriers. 
 
Although South Africa has a well-structured labour relations framework, in practice, collective 
bargaining exposes various malfunctions. Generally, collective bargaining is often 
characterised through very long wage negotiations accompanied by industrial action which in 
turn often leads to intimidation and violence.279 
Moreover, if wage negotiations reach an impasse, the parties usually declare them to disputes 
with the consequence that the responsibility of achieving an agreement is passed to the statutory 
dispute resolution body.280 Even though this mechanism intends to facilitate the conclusion of 
an agreement, in fact, it promoted the widespread inability of the parties to negotiate 
effectively.281 
Furthermore, the absence of sufficient social security provided by the state resulted in 
employers being confronted with societal issues such as housing, healthcare, transport and 
education as objectives to collective bargaining.282 Shifting full responsibility for these sensible 
issues towards the employer even increases the burden on industrial relation. 
Besides, often trade unions were not able or willing to push through their demands for higher 
wages. In 2012, only around 30 percent of all workers enjoyed coverage by collective 
agreements, regardless of whether they belonged to a trade union or not.283 This is a decline of 
nearly ten percent compared to 2008. According to the South African government, in 2014 
collective bargaining coverage in the labour market declined even to approximately 15 
percent.284 In contrast, the union density rate, describing is the percentage of workers belonging 
to a trade union stayed stable. Thus, over 25 percent of all earning workers are members of a 
trade union in 2015.285 Even though, coverage of collective agreements is not a guarantee for 
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fair wages. For example, across the private sector bargaining councils agreed on a monthly 
wage of only R2731.74.286  
 
The different kinds of measures being discussed to challenge income and labour market 
inequality must been seen in light of the above mentioned circumstances.  
One option to reduce income inequality is the granting of public transfer payments for those 
earning less. Without doubt, this option of social contribution constitutes a heavy burden for 
the government’s budget and is hardly suitable for countries low economic growth and weak 
government revenue. Moreover, it does not stop the race to the bottom on wages. New 
technology and international trade led to increasing externalisation and replacement of work 
by imports.287 Besides international agreements, one answer to combat wage dumping is the 
establishment of statutory wage floors. As employers generally benefit from global value 
chains and externalisation possibilities, it seems also legitimate to oblige them to pay minimum 
wages. Therefore, states shall be encouraged to grant social welfare but handled as a 
complementary policy to the minimum wage implementation.288 
For a long time the relationship between the collective bargaining system and a NMW was at 
the core of the debate on implementing a minimum wage. Some proponents argued that wages 
should be negotiated exclusively by the social partners in interplay with a free market.289 Others 
favoured little governmental intervention to achieve general application by maintaining the 
possibility to extend collective agreements.290 Regarding the situation in South Africa, both 
argumentations are not convincing. Weak trade unions and poor collective agreement coverage 
were not able to comprehensively ensure decent wages which led to the introduction of sectoral 
determinations. To conclude, evidence has shown that collective bargaining alone is not able 
to protect the most vulnerable with the least bargaining power. 
 
5.5.2 The need for multiple policies 
 
Considering the various reasons for unequal distribution of income and unemployment in South 
Africa, one must confirm the ILO’s stance that one single approach is unlikely to bring about 
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a lasting structural improvement to these issues. Instead, in accordance to paragraph 1 of ILO 
Recommendation No. 135, it is expedient to combine different labour market policies, 
particularly pro-employment policies, transfer payments, and business incentives to ensure an 
environment for sustainable enterprises. 
 
With regard to the different scope of minimum wages and collective bargaining, the ILO 
correctly recommends that  
 
‘minimum wages should be targeted at the lowest-paid employees, while collective bargaining 
can set wage floors but should also promote wage increases for workers who also earn more 
than the minimum, in line with productivity growth.’291 
 
Thus, combining the effects seems to be a successful strategy to address the interests of both, 
the lowest-paid employees and other employees earning above the minimum wage.  
 
As minimum wages set up in sectoral determinations in average also fall below an hourly wage 
of R20, a statutory minimum wage consequently would rise wages not only for workers not 
covered by any wage floor but also for a significant number of employees who do enjoy 
sectoral determination coverage.292 
However, recently the Basic Condition of Employment Amendment Bill, 2017 repealed 
Chapter 8 and 9 of the BCEA and consequently transformed the existing sectoral 
determinations into static constructs without further adjustment possibility. This was justified 
by stating that  
 
‘[t]hese chapters are deleted from the BCEA as they are being replaced by the national 
minimum wage, the National Minimum Wage Commission and transitional provisions that will 
set a certain period for the continued operation of sectoral determinations.’293 
 
This governmental initiative is not conducive as it eliminates one pillar within the South 
African wage setting mechanism which should better complement the new minimum wage 
legislation. The system of sectoral determinations not only includes sectoral minimum wage 
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setting but moreover stipulates conditions of employment, which are not concerned by the 
NMW. By repealing this tool, the legislator withdraws the possibility to set unilaterally higher 
sectoral minimum wages in industries which are less vulnerable. Furthermore, an adjustment 
for other conditions of employment through sectoral determinations is also no longer possible. 
As there is no plausible reason to delete this tool, the repeal should be reversed in order to 
bolster the entire minimum wage legislation. 
 
For similar reasons, the NMW also does not make the extension of collective agreements 
obsolete. It is reasonable to further an extend bargaining council agreements with wages 
exceeding the minimum wage and other employment benefits in case the social partners meet 
the requirements of section 32 of the LRA. A co-existence of a statutory minimum wage and 
sectoral minimum wages make up ‘hybrid minimum wage regime’ which in turn can stabilize 
the whole collective bargaining system.294 
 
Taken together, the NMW may indeed contribute to an increase of social justice in South Africa 
as long as it is carefully designed and embedded in a labour market approach, based on multiple 
policies. Empirical evidence has shown that negative employment effects are largely channeled 
through employers’ adoption measures. Furthermore, they can be minimized by setting an 






                                                






The NMW is an internationally well-known labour policy approach which intends to alleviate 
social injustice and poverty by mitigating wage inequality and facilitating economic growth. 
Although the economic and social situation in South Africa is different to the situation in 
Germany, both countries record a large low-wage sector and raising wage inequality leading 
to an increase of poverty.  
 
Bearing in mind that well-intentioned labour regulations may sometimes have unfortunate or 
unintended consequences, the MiLoG tend to be a comprehensive framework which sensibly 
complements the existing collective bargaining system. It is well-balanced and considers major 
principles summed up by the ILO. This includes a universal coverage which gives the 
framework a clear and simple structure; an adjustment mechanism which ensures the 
participation of the social partners; and a system for monitoring and enforcing compliance with 
the acts provisions. 
The overall provisional assessment of the new minimum wage legislation in Germany is rather 
positive. Although the low-wage sector did not decline substantially so far, most of the 
prognosticated negative effects did not occur. Instead, many workers now benefit from higher 
wages and economic growth increased. However, non-compliance and lacking capacity for 
adequate monitoring shows that success of minimum wage regulations depends on the 
interaction of two things: an efficient legal framework and a consequent implementation in 
practice. 
 
Currently, South Africa faces big social and economic challenges. The introduction of the 
NMW must withstand a high rate of unemployment, slow economic growth and political 
uncertainty. Like in many other countries, globalization and new forms of employment have 
changed the South African labour market and gave birth to a huge low-wage sector. 
Unfortunately, until now the existing collective bargaining system was not able to resolve the 
problems of wage dumping and rising income inequality. 
The proposed Bill provides an overall comprehensive legal framework. The manageable 
number of wage tiers takes into account special vulnerable sectors but still maintains 
simplicity; definitions and provisions regarding the calculation of the minimum wage ensure 
clarity and minimize misinterpretation.  
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However, the Bill also incorporates problematic provisions and should be complemented by 
additional amendments. First, the general exemption mechanism with limited assessment 
criteria may undermine the universal minimum wage application and should be replaced 
through a grant application mechanism for employers who are able to prove their inability to 
pay the minimum wage. Second, the government should not be entitled to unilaterally block 
the Commissions adjustment recommendations. This would impede possible interfere from 
external interest groups and ensure a dynamic adjustment procedure. Finally, it seems 
expedient to complement the Bill by adding additional provisions in a manner comparable with 
the MiLoG. In that regard, setting up compulsory documentary requirements and the 
establishment of a competent information centre are of particular importance.  
 
Given that especially the economic situation in South Africa is difficult, the introduction of the 
NMW bears more risks than in Germany. Nevertheless, weighing up possible negative 
employments effects against the likely benefits of substantial wage increases and economic 
stimuli leads to the conclusion that a well-designed minimum wage framework can indeed 
contribute to poverty alleviation. Among other policy approaches, the minimum wage should 
constitute one important pillar to enhance social justice and decent living conditions in South 
Africa. The National Minimum Wage Act as proposed by the Bill is improvable but its 










1. Primary Sources 
 
ILO Conventions and Recommendations  
• Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 26). 
• Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Recommendation, 1928, 1928 (No. 30). 
• Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91). 
• Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95). 
• Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention, 1951 (No. 99). 
• Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). 
• Minimum Wage Fixing Recommendation, 1970 (No. 135). 




• Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 
• Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
• Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA). 
• National Minimum Wage Bill, 2017 (‘Bill’). 
German 
• Civil Code, 1900 (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB). 
• Collective Agreements Act, 1969 (Tarifvertragsgesetz, TVG). 
• Temporary Employment Businesses, 1972 (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz, AÜG). 
• Third Book of the Social Code, 1998 (Drittes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB III). 
• Vocational Training Act, 2005 (Berufsbildungsgesetz, BBiG). 
• Posted Workers Act, 2009 (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz, AEntG). 
• Minimum Wage Act, 2015 (Gesetz zur Regelung eines allgemeinen Mindestlohns – 
Mindestlohngesetz, MiLoG).  
 
Cases 






2. Secondary Sources 
 
• Adelzadeh, A., Alvillar C. (2016). ‘The impact of a national minimum wage on the 
South Africa economy’ Working Paper Series, No. 2, Wits University, Johannesburg. 
 
• Amlinger, M., Bispinck, R., Schulten, T. (2016). ‘The German Minimum Wage: 
Experiences and Perspectives after One Year’ WSI-Report No. 28e 1/2016, 
Duesseldorf. 
 
• BBC (2016). ‘South Africa regains Africa's 'biggest economy' title from Nigeria’ 
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37045276, accessed on 7 
February 2018. 
 
• BDA (2016). (The Confederation of German Employers’ Associations) ‘Gesetzlicher 
Mindestlohn führt zu mehr Bürokratie und Rechtsunsicherheit und bleibt nicht ohne 
negative Folgen für Beschäftigung’ available at 
https://www.arbeitgeber.de/www/arbeitgeber.nsf/res/Stn-MiLoV.pdf/$file/Stn-
MiLoV.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• BEIS (2015). (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) ‘UK Low 
Pay Commission Report 2015’ 
 
• Bezuidenhout, A. (2000). ‘Towards global social movement unionism? Trade union 
responses to globalization in South Africa’ Discussion Paper DP/115/2000 
(International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva). 
 
• BMAS (2015a). (German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) ‘The 
Minimum Wage Act in detail Objectives, application, implementation and control’ 
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/electronic/99504/118810/F-
412371288/deu99504%20Guidelines.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 





mindestlohn.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed on 7 February 2018.  
 
— (2017). ‘Country profile Germany’ available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-17300915, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• BMWT (2006). (German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology) ‘Wind 
Power’ available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20061210163253/http://www.german-renewable-
energy.com/Renewables/Navigation/Englisch/wind-power.html, accessed on 7 
February 2018. 
 
• Bosch, G. (2015). ‘The bumpy road to a National Minimum Wage in Germany’ 
University Duisburg-Essen / Institute for Work, Skills and Training, Duisburg. 
 
• Bossler, M., Gerner, H-D. (2016). ‘Employment effects of the new German 
minimum wage Evidence from establishment-level micro data’ Series/Report no.: 
IAB-Discussion Paper 10/2016, Institute for Employment Research of the Federal 
Employment Agency, Nuremburg. 
 
— (2017). ’Auswirkungen des Mindestlohns aus der betrieblichen Perspektive’ Series 
"Mindestlohn" in: IAB-Forum, Institute for Employment Research of the Federal 
Employment Agency, Nuremburg. 
 
• Bruttel, O., Baumann, A., Dütsch, M. (2017). ’The new German statutory minimum 
wage in comparative perspective: Employment effects and other adjustment channels’ 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 1-18. 
 
• Bundestag (2016a). ‘Bundestag document 18/11475 (2016): 19’. 
 




• Burauel, P., Caliendo, M., Fedorets, A., Grabka, M., Schröder, C., Schupp, J., and 
Wittbrodt L. (2017). ‘Minimum wage not yet for everyone: on the compensation of 
eligible workers before and after the minimum wage reform from the perspective of 
employees’ DIW Economic Bulletin 49.2017 509-523. 
 
• Caliendo M., Fedorets A., Preuss M., Schröder C., Wittbrodt L. (2017). ‘The 
Short-Run Employment Effects of the German Minimum Wage Reform’ IZA DP No. 
11190 Institute of Labor Economics. 
 
• Cermak, C. (2017). ‘Why Germany's Surplus Is So Huge’ available at 
https://global.handelsblatt.com/finance/why-germanys-surplus-is-so-huge-752529, 
accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Castel-Branco, R. (2016). ‘Policy Considerations for the Design and Implementation 
of a NMW for South Africa’ Wits University, Johannesburg. 
 
• CIA (2018). ‘CIA World Factbook’ available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html (page last 
updated on January 2018), accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Conway-Smith, E. (2014). ‘20 years since apartheid: What's changed in South 
Africa, and what hasn't’	available at https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-27/20-years-
apartheid-whats-changed-south-africa-and-what-hasn’t, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Cunningham, W. (2007). ‘Minimum wages and social policy: lessons from 
developing countries’ The World Bank, Washington. 
 
• DAFF (2011). (Department: Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) ‘Competitiveness of 
selected South African agricultural products in the European union market’. 	
	
• Datafirst (2017). ‘South Africa - Labour Market Dynamics in South Africa 2014’ 
available at https://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za/dataportal/index.php/catalog/536, accessed 




• Davis, M. (2017). ‘South Africa Is Now Officially In A Recession As The Economy 
Keeps On Shrinking’ available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2017/06/06/south-
africa-is-now-officially-in-a-recession-as-the-economy-kee_a_22128210/, accessed 
on 7 February 2018. 
 
 
• Destatis (2011). ‘Statistisches Jahrbuch 2016’ available at 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/StatistischesJahrbuch/EinkommenKonsum
Leben.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
— (2017). ‘Verdienste auf einen Blick, 2017’ available at 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/VerdiensteArbeitskosten/Arbei
tnehmerverdienste/BroschuereVerdiensteBlick0160013179004.pdf?__blob=publicatio
nFile, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Deutsche Handwerks Zeitung (2016). ’Mindestlohn: 8,84 Euro seit dem 1. Januar 
2017’ available at https://www.deutsche-handwerks-zeitung.de/mindestlohn-steigt-
zum-1-januar-2017-auf-884-euro/150/3094/332019, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• DGB (2017). (German Trade Union Confederation) ‘DGB-Faktencheck: 
Niedriglöhne in Deutschland’ available at 
http://www.dgb.de/themen/++co++4c4fccfc-737a-11e7-b9d0-525400e5a74a, 
accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Diekmann, F. (2016). ‘Armutsrisiko steigt auf höchsten Stand seit 
Wiedervereinigung’ available at http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/armut-in-
deutschland-das-risiko-steigt-wieder-obwohl-die-wirtschaft-laeuft-a-1112646.html, 
accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• DIW Köln (2014). (The Cologne Institute for Economic Research) ‘Die 
Niedriglohnbranchen boomen’ available at https://www.iwd.de/artikel/die-




• DoL (2014). (Department of Labour) ‘Investigation into a National Minimum Wage 
in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/documents/tenders/minimumwages_tende
rs2014.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
— (2017a). ‘Agreement on the introduction of a National Minimum Wage’. 
— (2017b). ‘Government Gazette No. 41257 of 17 November 2017’. 
 
• EC (2016). (European Commission) ‘Commission Staff Working Document - 
Country Report Germany 2016’. 	
	
• Elsey, T., Mthethwa, G. (2014). ‘Wage Determination in South Africa since 1994’ 
Bargainging Indicators 2014 – A Labour Perspective, Labour Research Service, Cape 
Town. 
 
• Finkenwirth A., Diemand, S. (2017). ‘Wie arm sind die Deutschen?’ available at: 
http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2017-03/armutsbericht-2017-deutschland-
paritaetischer-wohlfahrtsverband-faq, accessed on 7 Febrary 2018. 
 
• Garloff, A. (2016). ‘Side effects of the new German minimum wage on (un-) 
employment: First evidence from regional data’ IAB Discussion Paper 31/2016 
Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Employment Agency, Nuremberg. 
 
— (2017). ’Der Mindestlohn ist kein Jobkiller’ Series "Mindestlohn" in IAB-Forum, 
Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Employment Agency, Nuremburg. 
	
• Godfrey, S., Theron, J., Visser, M. (2007). ‘The State of Collective Bargaining in 
South Africa: An Empirical and Conceptual Study of Collective Bargaining’ 
Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 07/130, Cape Town. 
 
• Grant Thornton (2012). ‘International Business Report 2012: Emerging markets 




• Grogan, J. (2014). Collective Labour Law Second Edition, Juta, Cape Town. 
 
• Hepple, B. (1995). ‘The Future of Labour Law’ 17 Comp. Lab. L. 626-647.	
	
• Herr, H., Kazandziska, M. (2011). ‘Principles of Minimum Wage Policy – 
Economics, Institutions and Recommendations’ International Labour Office, Geneva: 
ILO. 
 
• Höltmann, I. (2015). ’Wie Unternehmen den Mindestlohn umgehen’ available at 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/lohndumping-wie-unternehmen-den-
mindestlohn-umgehen/11615396.html, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• ILO (1992). ‘Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations: Minimum wages, Report III (Part 4B)’ International Labour 
Conference, 79th Session, Geneva (Articles 19, 22 and 35 of the Constitution).  
 
— (2012). ‘Global Wage Report 2012/13’. 
 
— (2014). ‘Minimum wage systems’ International Labour Conference 103rd Session, 
General Survey of the reports on the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 
131). 
 
— (2015). ‘Collective bargaining: a policy guide’ International Labour Office, 
Governance and Tripartism Department (GOVERNANCE), Conditions of Work and 
Equality Department (WORKQUALITY). 
 
— (2016). ILO ‘Minimum Wage Policy Guide’. 
 
• IMF (2011a). IMF Country Report No. 11/258 ‘South Africa’ 
 
— (2011b). IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 11/115. 
 




— (2017). IMF Country Report No. 17/189 ‘South Africa’. 
 
• Jacobs, M. (2017). ‘Bargaining along value chains – the changing nature of collective 
bargaining in South Africa’ University of Cape Town. 
 
• Janssen, R. (2015). ‘The German Minimum Wage Is Not A Job Killer’ available at 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-german-minimum-wage-is-not-a-job-killer, accessed 
on 7 February 2018.  
 
• Kalina, T., Weinkopf C. (2015). ’Niedriglohnbeschäftigung 2013: Stagnation auf 
hohem Niveau’ IAQ-Report 03/2015, Institute for Work, Skills and Training, 
University of Duisburg-Essen. 
 
— (2017). ’Niedriglohnbeschäftigung 2015 – bislang kein Rückgang im Zuge der 
Mindestlohneinführung’ IAQ-Report 06/2017, Institute for Work, Skills and Training, 
University of Duisburg-Essen. 
 
• Kangarlou, T. (2013). ‘South Africa since apartheid: Boom or bust?’ available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/27/business/south-africa-since-apartheid/index.html, 
accessed on 7 February 2018.   
 
• Kathmann, T. (2017). ‘Zum Wechselverhältnis von Mindestlohn und Tarifpolitik’ 
Working Paper Forschungsförderung No. 045, Hans Böckler Stiftung, Duesseldorf. 
 
• Konopelko, E. (2016a). ‘Incentives to Enhance Compliance with a NMW in South 
Africa’	Policy Brief #5, Wits University, Johannesburg. 
 
— (2016b). ‘Exclusions and Exemptions from a National Minimum Wage System’ 




• Kwasniewski, N, Elmer, C. ‘Wo Sie mit Ihrem Einkommen stehen’ available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/einkommen-und-gehalt-wo-sie-im-
vergleich-liegen-a-920777.html, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., McEwen, H., Koep, C. (2009). ’Employment and 
Inequality Outcomes in South Africa’ University of Cape Town. 
 
• Lesch, H. (2016). ’Ein Jahr gesetzlicher Mindestlohn: Auswirkungen auf 
Beschäftigung, Preise und Lohnstruktur’ DIW Köln, IW-Report 20/2016. 
 
• Marinakis, A. (2008). ‘The role of the ILO in the development of minimum wages’ 
International Institute for Labour Studies, ILO, Santiago. 
 
• Martens, B. (2010). ‘Wirtschaftlicher Zusammenbruch und Neuanfang nach 1990’ in 
bpb Dossier: Lange Wege der Deutschen Einheit 63-68.	
	
• Meer, J., West, J. (2015). ‘Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment Dynamics’ 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Upjohn Institute working paper 15-233, 
available at https://doi.org/10.17848/wp15-233, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Melin, M. (2016). ‘Here's how the refugee crisis is impacting Germany's economy’ 
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/impact-refugee-crisis-on-germanys-
economy-2016-3, accessed on 7 Febraury 2018. 
 
• Mindestlohnkommission (2016). (German Minimum Wage Commission) ’Erster 
Bericht zu den Auswirkungen des gesetzlichen Mindestlohns: Bericht der 
Mindestlohnkommission an die Bundesregierung nach § 9 Abs. 4 Mindestlohngesetz’ 
available at https://www.mindestlohn-
kommission.de/DE/Bericht/pdf/Bericht2016.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4, 




• Mkokeli, S., Cohen, M. (2016). ‘Minimum wage: SA moves to calm labour market’ 
available at https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/economy/minimum-wage-sa-
moves-to-calm-labour-market-2092103, accessed on 7 February 2018.  
 
• NEDLAC (2016). ‘National Minimum Wage Panel Report to the Deputy President – 
Recommendations on Policy and Implementation’.	
	
• Newham, G. (2014). ‘Why is Corruption is Getting Worse in South Africa’ available 
at http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/why-is-corruption-getting-worse-in-south-
africa/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Ngcukaitobi, T. (2013). ‘Strike Law, Structural Violence and Inequality in the 
Platinum Hills of Marikana’ 34 Indus. L.J. (Juta) 839- 846. 
 
• Nicolson, G. (2012). ‘Labour Law Amendments Provoke Unions' Ire’ available at	
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-04-05-labour-law-amendments-
provoke-unions-ire/#.Wn20H5P1VE4, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• OECD (2017). ‘Economic Policy Reforms 2017: Going for Growth’ Paris. 
	
—	(2018). https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/wage-levels.htm, accessed on 7 February 
2018. 
 
• Pencavel, J. (1999). John Pencavel ‘The Appropriate Design of Collective Bargaining 
Systems: Learning From the Experience of Britain, Australia and New Zealand’ 
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 464-67.  
 
• Rani, U., Belser, P., Oelz, M., Ranjbar, S. (2013). ’Minimum wage coverage and 





• Rudzio, K. (2017). ‘Wie arm ist Deutschland wirklich?’ available at 
http://www.zeit.de/2017/17/armut-deutschland-wirtschaftsboom-sozialhilfe-
einkommen, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Schupp, J. (2014). ’Wer profitiert vom Mindestlohn?’ DIW Wochenbericht Vol. 81 
Iss. 6, 112. 
 
• Schwab, K. (2016). ‘The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017’ World 
Economic Forum, Geneva.  
 
• Seekings, J., Nattrass, N. (2015). ‘What is at issue in the minimum wage debate?’ 
University of Cape Town.  
 
• Selala, K J. (2014). ‘The Right to Strike and the Future of Collective Bargaining in 
South Africa: An Exploratory Analysis’ International Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 
3/No. 5/special issue/2014 115-126. 
 
• Soobedaar, A. (2017). ‘Five Challenges Facing Collective Bargaining in South 
Africa’ available at http://www.perispec.co.za/insights/five-challenges-facing-
collective-bargaining-in-south-africa, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Spannagel, D., Seikel, D., Schulze Buschoff, K., Baumann, H. (2017). 
’Aktivierungspolitik und Erwerbsarmut in Europa und Deutschland’, WSI-Report Nr. 
36.  
 
• Spiegel Online (2015). ’Umgehungsstrategien der Arbeitgeber: Popcorn statt 
Mindestlohn’ available at	http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/mindestlohn-die-
umgehungsstrategien-der-arbeitgeber-a-1053039.html, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Statista (2017a). 
https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1224/umfrage/arbeitslosenquote-in-






und-armut-in-deutschland-quoten/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
— (2017c) https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/5760/umfrage/verfuegbares-
nettoeinkommen---einkommensklassen/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• The Economist (2017). ‘Surplus war Germany’s current-account surplus is a 
problem’ available at https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21716641-not-
reasons-donald-trump-thinks-it-germanys-current-account-surplus-problem, accessed 
on 7 February 2018. 
 
• Trading Economics (2018). Germany GDP available at 
https://tradingeconomics.com/germany/gdp, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• U.S. Geological Survey (2013). ‘Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2013’- 
 
— (2018) ‘Minerals Commodity Summeries 2018’. 
 
• Wagstyl, S. (2016). ‘Germany’s demographic dilemma’ available at 
https://www.ft.com/content/a4d8316e-8566-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5, accessed on 7 
February 2017. 
 
• World Bank (2016). ‘World DataBank, 2016’ available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
— (2017a). ‘Germany: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission’. 
 
— (2017b). ‘World Integrated Trade Solution database’ (Page refreshed: Jul-20-2017) 
available at 
http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/DEU/StartYear/2011/EndYear/2




• Worstall, T. (2016). ‘South Africa's Bad Decision On The R 3,500 Minimum Wage - 
It's Too High’ available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2016/11/21/south-africas-bad-decision-on-
the-r-3500-minimum-wage-its-too-high/#3f88a5f4762f, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
 
• WSI (2013). ‘WSI Tarifarchiv 2013’. 
 
• Zambia Business Times (2017). ‘Africa's Largest and most Industrialised Economy 
SA in Technical Recession’ available at 
https://zambiabusinesstimes.com/2017/06/06/africas-most-industrialised-economy-sa-
in-technical-recession/, accessed on 7 February 2018. 
	
